



QAWWAM

MARCH 2024



**THIS MAGAZINE IS NOT
IN REAL LIFE. WE AT Q
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EVERYTHING DESCRIBE
FOR HISTORICAL OR A
OR OTHERWISE MEA
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**NOT A CALL TO ACTIONS
AWWAM WILL NEVER
LEADERS TO BREAK THE
PUBLIC NUISANCE.
D IN OUR MAGAZINE IS
ACADEMIC PURPOSES,
ANT TO BE DONE IN
CRAFT.**





We're delighted to share our first issue of the year on the first Friday of Ramadan. May you reap the full blessings of this holy month and make permanent improvements to your adherence to the Sunnah of the Prophet ﷺ



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

amadan Mubarak to you all. We have a lot to treat you with this time around, and are proud to present it during the holiest of months. Despite us indeed wishing for and feeling the fresh air and transformed mood that comes with it each year, this issue didn't end up taking up much of a more "optimistic" feel at all. As you'll see in many of the incredible essays by our contributors this time around, much of what we'll rely upon as the positive future where Muslims, as an Ummah, will be on the upswing will be more far out than many of us hope for. Of course much can change in even a day and destroy every political theory and prediction brought about by brothers like ECO and IBN MAGHREB; but for now, it's clear to me at least that the voices of anonymous fellows such as these are far more valuable than that of the ridiculous class of self-important academics and political activist imams on the scene now.

As the Messenger of Allah ﷺ once said, this nation will come upon trials like pieces of a dark night. We're living in just one of those pieces, and to those of us who know the history (otherwise, what are you doing reading QAWWAM?), this is the piece of an unprecedented night where much of the Ummah is lost in werewolf country without

a flashlight or a map.


Most of the content in this issue comes from familiar faces. MUSLIM BITCOINER returns to continue his series in Qawwam Financial on usury with an in-depth essay on its consequences. EL ERRANTE delivers again from the life of Sultan Baybars, this time going over the unexpectedly whimsical arc during his rule where he tried to tie the Mamluk Sultanate back into the ethos of the forgotten Caliphate.

رَضِيَانٌ كَرِيمٌ

ECO EL-HOLLANDI continues his in-depth series on the shift in perspective Muslims need have, in his view, regarding Islam and Modernity. For my own contribution this issue, I included an essay meant to drop a few months ago but have updated due to recent events, regarding Muslim American resolve as they come into another chaotic election season. IBN MAGHREB returns this issue, this time in interview with yours truly where we have quite a long but fruitful discussion on much of the above, as well as all matters related to the American Empire and its decline. He goes right up against the perspective in my essay, so I encourage you to think about both and come to your own conclusion.

And so much more, let's get to it. Enjoy!

Abdullah Youssef



QAWWAM

MARCH 2024

BEYOND MODERNITY: PART 2 12

ECO EL-HOLLANDI returns with a sequel to his essay last issue on Islam and modernity as he makes an unconventional proposal for how Muslims should see their dismal state, and how other civilizations have coped with it.

AN OPEN LETTER TO AMERICAN MUSLIM LEADERS 22

The editor's contribution - an exhortation to the American Muslim community and their leaders on what must be done this upcoming election to delay the inevitable catastrophe.

THE FALCON OF QURAYSH 30


In this FIRASAH feature, an overview is presented on the underrated adventurous and mighty life of the first Emir of the Cordoba caliphate, Abdul Rahman I.

MAMLUK CORNER: BAYBARS AND THE CALIPHATE 35

EL ERRANTE returns to tell us about the interesting time Sultan Baybars, after seizing power, tried to solidify his rule through politico-religious means for once.

BAYT AL-ASAD 43

Swordfighting has been an essential part of male living for centuries, a boon of excitement lost from us for quite some time now. ISA MARTELL tells us about his attempts at reviving the forgotten art, and what it means to him.



A CONVERSATION WITH IBN MAGHREB 55



We're joined by IBN MAGHREB, the incredibly eloquent X poster, to talk about a variety of today's issues. Gaza, tech dork supremacy, the Hijra question, and Islamic political sovereignty are all discussed and more.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF RIBA 75

MUSLIM BITCOINER returns with another article on usury, this time detailing its macro consequences on modern finance, and how that matters to you, the everyday Muslim.

HAMZA YUSUF'S JIHAD ANTIDOTE 88


Shaykh ANWAR MANGAL goes after the ridiculous sleight of hand attempted by many to try and obfuscate the meaning of "Jihad" in Islam and uses a popular traditional scholar's blunders as an example. The first part of two.





RAMADAN KAREEM!

**We at QAWWAM wish you a blessed
Ramadan, emptied of wasteful sin
and replaced by a spiritual yearning
for the divine path and love for the
Messenger (SAW)**



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FICTION: 500 - 3,000 WORDS

ESSAYS: 500 - 2,500 WORDS

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ABDUL'S BIZARRE ADVENTURE



A large, colorful, abstract face sculpture hangs from a red canopy. The face is rendered in shades of green, yellow, and red, with a prominent eye and a mustache. The background is a dark, industrial-looking structure with a grid of metal beams. In the foreground, several silhouettes of people wearing hats are visible, walking along a path. The overall atmosphere is dramatic and artistic.

**THE PROBLEM OF POLITICS:
ISLAM BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST - PART 2**

ECO AL-HOLLANDI



“MOST OF THE RADICALS IN THE WEST, BESIDES A SMALL GROUP, ARE BROADLY IN SUPPORT OF MODERNITY. THEY MIGHT BE DISINFECTED OR IN DISAGREEMENT ABOUT HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS RUNNING THINGS, BUT THEY ARE OFTEN IN FULL SUPPORT OF THE IDEAS THAT UNDERLINE THE MODERN PROCESS, AT MOST DISAGREEING WITH HOW ONE SHOULD HANDLE THAT PROCESS.”

In the first article of this series, we discussed the problem of modernity, the way in which it behaves and why it is so important that we understand that it is the modern process itself that is our “other”. Those who’ve read that article might remember we specifically took a stance against a framing of the problem as “the West” as in the Western people and/or Europeanness itself, instead making the argument that Islam offers a way to an authentic, alternative future for all cultures—including European cultures—and that as such it could never be the case that these cultures were the direct “other”.

The reason that the modern process itself was signified as such was that it behaves in the exact opposite manner as Islam; with the latter offering the opportunity for differing cultures to authentically form around a unified essence, thus creating a unity in a patchwork of (true) diversity, where the former instead fragmentizes the world into a bland nothingness, offering a false diversity that is only diverse on the surface.

But especially because we began that first article with a discussion on the weakness of the Muslim world in light of

the situation in Palestine, there remains a question of what we can do to get out of this weak state. Furthermore, while the Westerner, or Western culture, is not our enemy, the West as a political entity is the force that backs and enforces the modern process around the world. While we, by necessity, had to lay down the foundation and thus discuss the idea of Islam being the opposite to modernity, we can now move to an analysis of this political West and how Muslims should deal with the political reality of being faced with an overwhelming force in a world where we have so little power.

THE POLITICAL WEST AND THE MODERN PROCESS

We described in depth how the modern process is destructive by nature. It tears apart authentic cultures and leaves behind nothing real or human. Because of this, it fragmentizes the world while simultaneously moving that world into a global drab of nothingness. This is true for all corners of the world and especially for the West itself, where modernity originated.

It would thus be easy to assume that, if the political West globally backs and enforces this process, it is thus anti-self and is actively looking for the world's destruction. While this explanation would surely find favor among the more conspiracy-minded, this is in fact rather far from the truth. The political West believes in the ideas that kickstarted and continue to feed the modernity process, as well as believing in parts of this process, such as Capital and technological growth, but it does not like the output of the process as such.

In the first article we discussed Deleuze & Guattari's concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, explaining that they believed that reterritorialization always accompanies deterritorialization and that reterritorialization is in fact nothing but the attempt to stabilize the process, while simultaneously normalizing the earlier breakdown of authentic structures.

It is reterritorialization which the Western political entities, and in some sense all political entities, are looking for. This means that, while the Western political entity backs the process in theory, it attempts to ward off its negative effects by reterritorializing the previously deterritorialized entity. Of course,

this is quite logical, every political entity wants and aims for growth, it's a big part of how they retain power and in the modern world, growth is identified by the modern process itself.

In practice however, this leads to a political power that behaves rather schizophrenically, on the one hand—at home—where these ideas originated, it attempts to stabilize the process, attempting to ward off any radicalism leading to further deterritorialization (and thus destabilization). On the other hand, by reterritorializing they normalize the new reality, consequently enforcing this around the world and demanding others adapt to it.

THE FAUSTIAN SPIRIT

The attempts to stabilize the process at home have not exactly led to a peaceful political situation. In fact, it wouldn't be far-fetched to say that the tensions caused by the culture war in the West have reached unprecedented levels far beyond those of other nations. So why is it the case that despite their attempts at stabilization these tensions seem so high in the West?

Part of this we have explained, namely: that the Western political entity is increasingly attempting to play catch up while the process accelerates. There is also a role that the media and social institutions play here in spreading the desire of taking part in

the process among individuals (both inside and outside the West). It would be too time consuming to go deep into the role of media and institutions here but it is important to remember that these individual desires serve as fuel for the flames.

What we can furthermore say is that this increase in desire and tensions has little to do with an actual opposition. While it is often said that people are "radicalizing" in the West, they are only doing so from the point of view of a system that throughout the 20th century has attempted to narrow down the political Overton window (as radicalism leads to opposition and to "ideas of alternatives") as politics became more and more about stabilization.

But in fact, even most of the radicals in the West, besides a small group, are broadly in support of modernity. They might be disinfected or in disagreement about how the government is running things, but they are often in full support of the ideas that underline the modern process, at most disagreeing with how one should handle that process. The question of why this is so gets us back to the topic of Western or European culture and the Westerner or European being different from the process that we discussed in the first

article.

European man has often been associated with something called “the Faustian spirit.” It is this spirit—which is said to be innate to European man—and its drive for progression and expansion, that makes the West unable to step away from the modern process as it is defined by an endless progression. That progression eventually leads to dehumanization, as with that progression comes an ever-increasing fragmentation.

Now, perhaps this seems contradictory to the first article. Didn't we say that there is nothing about the Westerner that cannot let him have an authentic culture with an Islamic essence? How can this be when the Faustian spirit is innate to the European? We maintain that this is only a contradiction on the surface. Because while that spirit exists, there is nothing wrong with the European, exploratory spirit. In fact, it has given the world much beauty and is exemplified by a praiseworthy drive for novelty and adventure, fundamental parts of the human experience.

The problem is that with the onset of modernity, the increase in individualism and the subsequent decline of religion, there was suddenly no institution to guide and define the borders for that spirit. As

markets pushed technological innovation further, people's individual desires increased, thus giving the markets more capital to innovate further. wanting to push further and further, even beyond the point of humanity. There are various moments that can be seen as decisive which would take too long to discuss here, but what is clear is that somewhere those innovations, driven by that Faustian spirit, ran out of control. The problem thus, is not the Faustian spirit itself, but the fact that it blended with its own creation – modernity itself. In modernity, the Faustian spirit is unlimited and not mitigated by humans but rather is increasingly controlled by the process itself.

In an almost comically ironic sense, with the renaissance beginning as a humanist project and with various revolutions in name of the freeing up of the individual, in retrospect we see that with the fall of religion, there was suddenly no reason for humanity's exceptionalism and as such no reason for the process of growth to stop once it wasn't beneficial to humanity anymore. This gets us to a crucial point with regard to the political dimension. While we said in the first article that the entire world is largely modernized (and thus, westernized) an alternative modernity cannot under any circumstance arise in the contemporary West.

ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION AND THE DISMAL STATE OF MUSLIMS

If Europeans, due to their possession of the Faustian spirit, are unable to stop modernity, our thesis that Islam is the exact opposite of modernity suggests that it alone is capable of this, exactly because it would be able to contain that spirit of a nation, using it to give shape to Islam while mitigating the Faustian spirit, rather than letting it reign free. Here we get into the practical problem that has been looming over our heads since the introduction to the first article.

While in theory it might be good to know that Islam offers a solution to the problem of modernity, we have noted in the previous article that Muslims themselves are utterly modernized; a problem which is exacerbated by cyberspace, media and cultural institutions. In combination with the earlier mentioned enforcement of those reterritorialized values this creates an inability for most Muslims to tap into Islam's true potential and, knowingly or unknowingly, makes them partial to the modern process, even if they claim to be in opposition to it.

Because the way politics works in a modernized Western world, Muslims cannot expect to vote their

way out of this. As the system is driven to stabilize, it will inherently only allow ideas which are strictly in line with it. Let it not be thought however that we should engage in something such as a violent revolution. Besides the fact that it would be ridiculous to even think one has a chance of winning such a conflict in the weak state that we are in, it also doesn't fix anything, and we have seen that this is in fact itself a modern phenomenon.

As we discussed in the first article, this is evidenced by both extreme ends of the modern Muslim; the Jihadist and the progressive Muslim. Both groups have repeatedly made the mistake of thinking that Muslims should take up the weapons and engage in mass revolution, resulting in the same mistakes of calling for (either Jihadist or decolonialist) violent action.

Engaging in such acts has not only been tried and miserably failed (along with the destruction it brought along) but it also makes us unable to tap into Islam's true essence, which is not barbaric and destructive but rather builds up towards the high.

Yuk Hui, furthermore, points out that this attempt to fight against the modern West as a way to shift to an alternative, more authentic future, has already been tried by others in "the East." He provides the example

of Japan and the Kyoto school of thought, who became ardent supporters of the Japanese regime and the idea of a World War in the years before WWII, as a way to give Japan the power to move away from global domination. As seen, Japan, after engaging in horrendous excesses, has been completely westernized and any semblance of traditional values no longer exist on a deeper level, but is a leftover residue of earlier, pre-modern times.

Hui discusses this example in his book on Cosmotechnics, in which he sets out his quest of looking for an authentic, Chinese post-modernity. This is interesting because often when we think of non-Western civilizations succeeding in breaking loose from the West we think of China. To get a better understanding of what we might do as Muslims we should perhaps take a further look at these alternate civilizations, which belong neither to the West, nor to the Islamic civilization that we have talked about up until now.

OTHER CIVILIZATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF THE WEST

When we analyze alternate civilizations, we see that some have indeed managed to protect itself against the West and have even become its direct global opponent and are even predicted to replace the West as a global superpower. China has, in some way, done exactly

what we talked about previously—creating an authoritarian state in an attempt to stabilize the process, managing to keep some of modernity's negative effects out the door through this authoritarianism, while simultaneously modernizing and keeping up with the West. Where the West has huge problems with these attempts of stabilization, as any form of authoritarianism strongly clashes with European sensibilities, the lack of the Faustian Spirit among the Chinese makes it easier for the Chinese government to implement such policies.

Now, one might have the idea that this means that we should study the way in which China became a superpower. While this makes sense, it is easier said than done; not in the least because the Chinese revolution began in a vastly different world from ours, where a feudalist empire was transformed into a communist state. Aside from these differences, China is not a perfect civilization to emulate. As we have seen, Yuk Hui himself is specifically trying to create a "Chinese (post-)modernity," as it is recognized that even though China might, for now, control the process and ward off some of its negative effects, that process itself is still utterly Western.

Furthermore, China still faces many of modernity's problems,

which is evident when looking at its declining fertility rate and the strong decline in social structures around its cities. As such, even an authoritarian regime like theirs is only partly capable of evading the effects of modernity and it has to do so by increasingly intruding upon the lives of its citizens.

Still, the Chinese do offer an alternative future to the Western one and certain philosophers such as Hui and others are attempting to search through Confucian and Taoist texts as a way of reclaiming some authentic Chinese element and creating a truly alternative future. While as a Muslim I believe they are incapable of this (which at this point needs no further explanation), their opposition to the West and their lack of the Faustian spirit does create chances for a world in which the military enforcement of Western values, that as of now has consistently kept Muslims from creating its own civilization, can be reduced.

This does not mean that we should “support” China (or any other civilization) only because they are “anti-Western” (a strategy or idea that in Leftist groups is sometimes aptly termed “Campism”). It does however mean that while other civilizations might harm Muslims in their direct sphere, and we should begrudge that, they seem to possess

less of the inherent drive to spread their way of living across the globe. Sure, one might point to China’s endeavors in Africa and other countries around the world and there is definitely a critique to be made here, but these places still do not become Culturally Chinese. Rather, the Chinese are there mainly for gaining power and seem uninterested in exporting their cultural products over the world.

I want to emphasize that Muslims should not take this as me advising to put our weight behind other civilizations. This is especially the case for Muslims living in the West themselves, who should refrain from becoming pariahs. Rather, the conclusion is that the political struggle with alternate civilizations and the internal problems with stabilization the West faces can result in a world in which the political West does not want to and/or is unable to enforce its values around the world.

Furthermore, the decline of the West means little if we don’t realize that other civilizations are unable to overcome modernity due to their lack of Islam. In fact, if we take Hui’s thesis that technology in modernity is utterly Western itself and combine it with the idea that only Islam can overcome modernity, then one might say that the Chinese becoming the global superpower will fix little in the long run. Even if such a civilization attempts to protect itself through

increasingly totalitarian forms of state repression, if the process continues to run, then eventually these walls will collapse. Still, if the West is unable to act as a “global police force” due to its internal problems and the global power struggle with these other civilizations, this can offer opportunities for us as Muslims to create our own civilization.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

The emulation of the rise of alternate civilizations such as China might be interesting but is a long project that requires tremendous effort, not only because we want to make sure that the Islamic spirit is sufficiently present to ward off the necessity of authoritarianism, but also because, as discussed, these civilizations became “their own” in very different times. Furthermore, in a world where our community has weakened, alienated from Traditional Islam and influenced by modernity, just attempting to “grab power” has, and will never, work.

It might come across as strange that I started off this article with the promise of discussing how the Muslim world in its current weak state might deal with that overwhelming Western political force and that the only prescriptions I have given up till now is that we should do nothing—we can’t vote, we shouldn’t commit violence, we

shouldn't act as pariah's etc. I have discussed the opportunity arising out of the contemporary situation of the world, but how are we to practically do this when in this article it seems that I'm only prescribing a series of can-nots and do-nots?

I am not proposing that we as Muslims sit back and hope that things fall into place for us. Rather, what I have attempted to show is that, while we might not have any strength to forcefully create our independence from other civilizations, the current state of the world does offer an opportunity to move away from that weakened state. The described problems that the political West is facing and the seeming lack of interest of other civilizations to become their own "global police" offer us the possibility of building ourselves up once more.

But this is of no benefit to us if we count on the masses, many of whom have already become modernized in their understanding of Islam themselves. What we should do then is use the expectation of an increasing lack of a political stranglehold on Muslims as a group to create communities of experts, who can rise above our weakened state of being, so that they might actually come to know how to give shape to a future Islamic civilization.

These communities (one might say: an Islamic elite) can think through a true alternative. As the differing global powers will increasingly be unable to deal with the problems of modernity, leading to their own collapse, this Islamic elite can give us the chance to offer an alternative when this moment arrives. If those "experts" among us furthermore manage to be "elite" by holding onto positions of power and having the necessary knowledge, they can use this future cataclysm to reshape the trajectory of the Islamic world and the world at large.

In the third and last part of this series I will bring together the conclusions from the first article and this one, to look at the why and how this Islamic elite might utilize the Islamic essence and their expertise to uplift us from our weak state and bring forth an Islamic future that is rooted in Islam's traditional essence and in authentic culture. 🛡️

*ECO POSTS ON X
@ECOREACTIONAIR*





**WE DON'T DO THAT IN
THE CALIPHATE**




THE MESSENGER OF ALLAH ﷺ SAID: "WHILE I WAS SLEEPING, I SAW MYSELF DRINKING (I.E. MILK), AND I WAS SO CONTENTED THAT I SAW THE MILK FLOWING THROUGH MY NAILS. THEN I GAVE (THE MILK) TO `UMAR." THEY (I.E. THE COMPANIONS OF THE PROPHET) ASKED, "WHAT DO YOU INTERPRET IT?" HE SAID, "KNOWLEDGE."

SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 3681

got laban?

ILLUMINATION THROUGH ACCELERATION

*ALLAH CREATED SUFFERING IN THIS WORLD FOR A REASON, BUT HE DIDN'T
MAKE IT ETERNAL. PUSH THROUGH AND MAKE THE WORST HAPPEN ALREADY!*



*IT'S HARAM TO
BLACKPILL.*



**FROM THE
EDITOR**

**AN OPEN LETTER TO
AMERICAN MUSLIM LEADERS**

WORDS: Abdullah Yousef

An exhortation to keep on after a step in the right direction:



As of writing this, Nikki Haley has recently quit her run for U.S. president, confirming what already was seen as a done deal since Trump's indictment charges were dropped last March: that the 2024 election would once again be between Trump and Biden. The polls consistently made it obvious for months, and Trump's astounding victories across the state primaries confirmed it. This part of the political debate regarding the election is decisively over. More interesting however is what happened on the Democrat side: Biden, the incumbent President and only relevant candidate in the blue primaries, lost the city of Dearborn, made up of a majority of Middle Easterners, by 6% to a vote of "Uncommitted."

We all know why this happened, but it's important to remember that something began to brew even before the devastating events in Gaza since October 7th, which is the sentiment in the American Muslim community that voting for Biden in 2020 by more than 70% of our demographic was, perhaps, a big mistake. Before the crisis of the Palestinians (once again) took our attention whole months back, many of you will remember that one of the hot topics in the American Muslim community was how exactly we were going to divorce ourselves

from the claws of leftist insanity that had gripped the country since the Obama years, and only continued to accelerate in derangement and open lewdness, ethnic narcissism, public indecency, and aggressive harassment towards anyone who dared to object to it. Many Muslims who were paying attention even back in 2019 were rightfully concerned about this as the rest of the country was too busy salivating over the latest scandalous Trump story of the week; but as we all know, the fear and anxiety induced by the pandemic that followed, concurrently with one of the greatest media manipulations in American history, spooked most into voting Democrat again; and to many of those I spoke to, this was to their great shame once they saw what followed.

If you're reading this because you felt you fell within the broad range the title of this letter implies: I'm here to make a plea with you. You might be one of CAIR's desk jockeys, a member of your local Masjid's board of trustees, or the school board of the Islamic school you send your young kids to. You might have been one of those connected enough to have been invited to the White House Iftar last year. Or, in all likelihood, you're just a Muslim parent who's fearful for your children's future. It's this last group I have the most sympathy for. My plea to you is this: do not, under any circumstance, break and cave like you did in 2020. I am asking

you, for once, to act and vote pragmatically like our enemies have done for longer than we and our parents have been in these lands.

Now, more than ever, American Muslims have been presented with the opportunity to make a statement to show what happens when we as an electorate are ignored, insulted, and shafted; yet are still expected to grovel like Pavlov's Dogs to the polls in November and vote Democrat like we've been told to. These concerns we voice are not only tied to us as Muslims who believe in traditional family values and public decency but to American First interests as a whole who are now far more concerned with domestic policy than idiotic ventures abroad that bleed this country dry.

It took, unfortunately, extreme aggression and devastation on the parts of America and Israel on our people in Gaza since October to instill in American Muslims this year, officially, the sense that this time around we're going to abandon Biden. I'm all for this — I wrote about this years ago when it was considered outrageous to say it — but like before in 2020, it's a decision based mostly on emotional impulse. We want to #AbandonBiden this time around because we, rightfully, feel angry and devastated at what this administration allowed to happen with their full endorsement and material support. Here lies the problem. Any demographic that is easily swayed by emotion will be the easiest to take advantage of by regime propaganda. I don't know what it will be at the time of writing this — none of us

do — but if you don't think the Biden regime is already preparing a Big Spook in the summer or fall to get us all back on the reservation after pissing us off these past few months, you're a complete fool.

What I'm asking is that you brace yourself from now. Prepare yourself not to listen to the shrieking of easily manipulated leftist activists (even if they wear Hijabs and speak Arabic) and degenerate lunatics on this issue just because they supported Palestine and Muslim civil rights. This group has failed us repeatedly and has proven itself to not care about the everyday concerns of normal, practicing Muslims. It's time we made our own way and risk alienating whoever we need to for the longer-term goal that very few seem to be voicing at the moment.

I know, it's not easy to just come out and say: I'm going to vote for Donald Trump, as an American Muslim, because I believe in goals for my community you don't understand right now. It's counterintuitive, I get it. But look around you. You have a family. You work hard. You went to college (or not), and you want to be able to send your kids there too. You don't want to be terrified of what they'll pick up there, or much earlier in school for that matter from pink-haired lunatics who think gender isn't real. Just like the people Trump appeals to, your economic power and community fabric are assaulted daily by lowlifes who despise everything good and beautiful in this world — which to you, is your ability to worship the One True God and teach your children to do the same, without being preyed on by demons in sheep's clothing.

You're in all likelihood not perfect yourself. You made a lot of compromises living in this country concerning your religion that you're not proud of, and it demoralizes you. That doesn't mean you just give up and go for the side that promises you gigs. This prosperous American Empire is sliding, and we all know it. You need to look ahead and give yourself time. None of us are prepared for another Biden presidency, and frankly, plenty of us can't afford it.

If you're going to say you're abandoning Biden, then it's abandoning Biden until the end. Not abandon Biden "until we see the other option is Trump." This is a bold claim for many of you. You have this idea, once accepting that it's either Trump or Biden, that you'll vote for a third candidate, or neither and just stay home. I'm going to claim, at my own risk, that you should indeed vote for Trump, however begrudgingly. I'll explain why.

Your goal, if you truly want to "make your voice heard," is not going to be achieved by rendering yourself a political nullity. Nothing is terrifying to the regime about a demographic that either votes or doesn't — what they're afraid of are those willing to vote for their enemies instead, even if it doesn't make sense to them. That means voting for Trump even if he rambles about "Radical Islamic Terror." It means voting for him even if he talks about how much he hates immigrants or — and I mean this — talks about how he's Israel's actual champion and is willing to do anything for them. The reality

when it comes to the regime and Israel is that things like MENA normalization with Zionism, IDF military funds, and censorship happen no matter which party is in office. The point of switching candidates this time, however, is to show that we aren't just a shoo-in for Democrats no matter what they do. A future administration that takes notice of a radical shift in our voting patterns will be far more inclined to make concessions than one that's convinced that "those Muslims will vote Democrat anyway no matter what we do to piss them off."

Many raised concerns rooted in the fear of twenty years ago post 9/11. After seeing a brief revival of that after October 7th, how can anyone blame you? But it's important to learn now that the Neocon Warhawk ideology and the horror that comes with it is no longer restricted to the Republican party. Many will argue it was never their exclusive specialty in the first place. The Democrats who sway racial and religious minorities with honeyed words have had just as much of a hand in spilling blood abroad and restricting religious freedoms on American soil in the name of their lord and savior Israel as much as any Republican.

This isn't an endorsement of Trump or the Republican party. It's an endorsement of the policy that you, my dear brothers and sisters, need to adopt — which is to think beyond the frame of two parties and more in terms of who appeases you and who doesn't. You need to think holistically. You've heard repeatedly, every four years, that we must choose between the lesser of two evils. It's time to admit that this isn't an exception, but the rule. As estranged



Muslims in a land ruled by those who hold no regard for our traditions or goals, we will never have a “good” choice in any election. It will always be, instead, an approximate one. This time, it’s as clear as it could be that the approximation needs to happen as a matter of punishing those we expected to be our public servants, instead of allowing ourselves to be punished by their arrogance every other day of the year.

Back in 2016, a common adage said by your average American Muslim was “We’re not voting for Hillary, we’re voting against Trump.” Well now we must ask, are you willing to vote not for Trump, but against Biden? 

Disclaimer: later in this issue, I have a discussion with the X user Ibn Maghreb on page XX where he offers a view completely antithetical to the sentiment proposed in this article, which might come off to some of you as nihilistic and insane. I still believe in everything above, but Ibn Maghreb, brilliant as always, forced me to be more critical about it and open to different possibilities. Some might say I’m overly poisoned with optimism. Still, I encourage you to check out both our views and decide for yourself what to predict.

Abu Musa al-Ashari reported: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, said, “Verily, right before the Hour there will be a tribulation like pieces of the dark night in which a man may be a believer in the morning and an unbeliever by evening, or a believer in the evening and an unbeliever by morning. He who sits down during it will be better than he who rises up, and he who walks during it will be better than one running. Break your bows, cut your bowstrings, and strike your swords against the rock. If someone comes to kill you, be like the better of the two sons of Adam.” (5:28)

Source: Sunan Abī Dāwūd 4259





Llanta, dib.º y lit.º

Lit. de Rubio, Grilo y Vituri.

> Sensitive Young Man

وَالْعَدِيَّتِ ضَبًّا ١ فَاَلْمُورِيَّتِ قَدْحًا ٢



FIRASAH

INTUITION OF DIVINE LIGHT

A vibrant, stylized illustration depicting a scene from Islamic history. In the center, a man with a long black beard and a red turban, dressed in a yellow and red robe, stands with his right arm raised, holding a sword. He is surrounded by a crowd of people in various traditional Islamic attire. To the left, a man in a black robe and red turban is kneeling, holding a book. In the background, there are domed buildings and other figures, some holding flags and weapons. The overall scene suggests a moment of divine revelation or a significant event.

Abu Sa'id al-Khudri reported: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, "Beware of the intuition of the believer. Verily, he sees with the light of Allah." Then, the Prophet recited the verse, "Verily, in that are signs for those of discernment."

Sunan al-Tirmidhi 3127

THE FALCON

ABDULRAHMAN I

731 A.D. – 788 A.D.

1ST UMAYYAD EMIR OF CORDOBA



Imagine a young Muslim man of twenty, of noble lineage, at towering yet thin stature, with somewhat good looks. He comes from dozens of generations of his people stretching out from his royal family to antiquity, his mother a foreign concubine from a land far away. This man's family which had ruled millions of square miles for generations as kings, after a steady but decadent decline ranging from inverted values to petty tribalist quibbling, is overrun and thrown out of power through a coup by a rival family.

This young man's family is defeated, and their enemies invite them to a feast as a show of good will. At the feast, almost all of his male relatives are clubbed to death while he escapes, fleeing with what remains of his family; including his brother and young son. They must now flee, pursued by ruthless assassins on horseback hoping for a hefty sum of coin from the new ruling dynasty in exchange for their heads. They make it over the Euphrates river, then around the entirety of their homeland to the south until he must abandon them in an unknown village, taking no one but his single freed servant with him.

He decides to travel to the land of his mother – neighboring a still-newly conquered peninsula across the Mediterranean of vast riches and fertile land on the verge of political collapse. It's ruler is greedy and wants independence from his new overlords. Years pass of being on the run,

changing names and bribing tribal leaders, eventually making it over to the peninsula and reviving old bonds of loyalty with what remains of your family's reputation. With no battle experience, all odds against him, he goes to war against his unruly rivals for power under the flag of Islam and a newly proclaimed emirate. He conquers any resisting territories with ease as his support among local leaders grows due to his lavish charisma and strength of will. Soon his emirate becomes absolute in the country, and rules for many decades before dying a natural death as a content old man, leaving his kingdom behind to his favorite son. His renewed dynasty rules for centuries, until deposed by another after a time of great prosperity and luxury.

Such was the life of Abd al-Rahman ibn Muawiya, founder of the Cordoba Caliphate in Al-Andalus, what we know historically as former Islamic Spain. This was a man who, in the face of certain defeat and death, rose not only to survive, but conquer and rule another land he knew nothing about. Before him, no other Umayyad had stepped foot in Al-Andalus. Abdulrahman, known from his actions within his lifetime as the Falcon of Quraysh, was the last in a line of a family that had once attained infinite glory through their victories in the name of Islam, the latter descendants of whom were then degraded by their neglect, abuse, and disrespect for Islamic law, custom, and the mandate to rule that Allah provides the righteous. They lost

their dynasty because as Allah tells us: He gives and takes kingship (Al-Mulk) to and from whomever He wishes. When you fail His religion and the legacy of His Prophet ﷺ, you're setting yourself on the path of acceleration to have it all snatched from you, and as we saw with the last Umayyads at the dinner table of their enemies; as brutally as possible.

Yet, after generations of decline at the end of his family legacy, Abd al-Rahman renewed his dynasty in another form – a thunderous kingdom of artistic and cultural glory; where he earned the mandate to rule once again and allowed his progeny to flourish for another civilizational cycle rather than go extinct immediately. And even more remarkable than that, he did it coming to a land that was not only alien, but being torn apart at the seams due to idiotic tribal resentments and differences which nearly cost the Muslims one of their grandest achievements in our history, the rule of Spain under *La Ilaha Illa Allah*,




Photo: Flag of the Emirate (later caliphate) of Cordoba

Muhammadan Rasulullah, the cultural and scientific achievements from it requiring several books to fully detail the later historical importance of, to both Orient and Occident.



Why I'm interviewing Tamerlane.





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
THESE WOMEN WILL DIE FOR RUMELIA



MAMLUK CORNER

A Series by
@elerrantenomad

#2



BAYBARS AND HIS ADHERENCE TO THE INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE

In 1260, Baybars ascended to power by eliminating Qutuz and led the state for a long period of seventeen years. Upon his accession, the realm was besieged by challenges on multiple fronts: the Mongols, whose incursions were a source of relentless pressure on the Islamic world, and the Armenians, who readily aligned themselves with the Mongols, adopting a confrontational stance. The state was not only imperiled by external adversaries but also suffered from a lack of cohesion internally. Baybars prioritized the restoration of internal order, quelling rebellions from emirs and addressing disturbances to consolidate his authority before turning his attention to external threats. Understanding the critical role of the Caliphate system as a cornerstone of legitimacy in the Islamic tradition, Baybars embarked on a strategic endeavor to align his rule with the spiritual and political authority embodied by the Abbasid Caliphate, which long had been forgotten in the minds of Muslims as being an entity of any significant power. This alignment was not just symbolic but a deliberate effort to weave the fabric of his rule into the broader tapestry of Islamic governance.

Following the Mongol invasion of Baghdad and the assassination of the

Abbasid Caliph Mu'tasim Billah, the Islamic world found itself without a caliph. Recognizing this void, Baybars decided to transfer the center of the Abbasid caliphate to Cairo. His aim was to legitimize his reign, fostering stability within the state, and bolstering political strength against external foes. In 1261, a man by the name of Abu'l-Qasim Ahmed, claiming to be a relative of the late Caliph, expressed his desire to join Baybars in Egypt through a letter. Baybars, who had already decided to bring Abu'l-Qasim Ahmed to Egypt, ordered his transfer to Cairo upon learning of his intentions. On June 9, 1261, A.D. (9th of Rajab, H.659), Abu'l-Qasim Ahmed arrived in Cairo and was met outside the city by Baybars. The Mamluk Sultan was accompanied by state dignitaries and a large number of people from the populace. Even Christians and Jews in Cairo, holding the Torah and the Gospels, were compelled to participate in this welcoming ceremony.

Four days after this grand reception, Baybars convened a meeting that included scholars, viziers, commanders, and the general populace. At this gathering, Abu'l-Qasim Ahmed's lineage was presented, and the scholars were asked to confirm its authenticity. Following thorough verification, Abu'l-Qasim Ahmed was declared the new Caliph with the title al-Mustansir Billah. Baybars, along with everyone present at



the meeting, pledged allegiance to the new caliph. After receiving allegiance, the caliph bestowed upon Baybars the sword of authority, granting him the mandate to rule over all Islamic lands and those to be conquered. Baybars ordered that the caliph's name be mentioned in sermons and inscribed on minted coins. This event significantly enhanced the Mamluks' prestige in the eyes of Muslims, as they'd taken over relatively recently, and strengthened their position in the Islamic world. By securing the caliph's endorsement, Baybars not only achieved supremacy in the Islamic world but also legitimized his sultanate according to the sharia. In legitimizing his rule, Baybars took on the mantle of Islam's defender and assumed the role of a leader in the Islamic world. In this context, he established favorable relations with Muslim Turkic states, particularly the Anatolian Seljuk State, and provided support to Muslims in Anatolia.

After spending some time in Egypt, the caliph expressed his desire to recapture Baghdad, the long-standing center of the caliphate. He communicated this wish to Baybars. Initially, Baybars decided to provide the Caliph with a military force of 10,000 soldiers. However, one of his commanders cautioned Baybars against dispatching such a large number of troops to Baghdad with the Caliph at a time when their military strength was crucially needed elsewhere. Heeding this advice, Baybars instead provided the Caliph with a contingent of 300 soldiers. Baybars and his forces escorted the Caliph towards Baghdad until Damascus, after which Baybars returned to Cairo on October 13, 1261. The result was a complete disaster. On December 28, 1261,

when the Caliph arrived at the location of Ane, he was ambushed by a Mongol unit under the command of Kara Boĝa, who had learned of his movement towards Baghdad. The Mongol forces decimated his army, composed of Turkmen and Arabs, slaughtering almost all of them. Among those killed was the Caliph himself.

Upon receiving the news of the Caliph's assassination by the Mongols, Baybars was deeply affected yet somewhat relieved. Despite offering all necessary assistance for the Caliph's return to Baghdad, Baybars was not keen on the idea. He believed that keeping the Caliph in Egypt would enable him to establish greater influence over the Islamic states. Upon learning of the caliph's assassination, Baybars summoned Abu'l-Abbas Ahmed, another descendant of the Abbasid line, to Egypt and declared him caliph. On January 19, 1262, Baybars welcomed Abu'l-Abbas Ahmed outside Cairo and accommodated him at Cairo's Burj al-Kebir, ensuring all his needs were met. A year later, on November 22, 1262, Baybars pledged allegiance to Abu'l-Abbas Ahmed, who he declared Caliph with the title Hakim Bi-Amrillah. However, Baybars did not permit the new Caliph to return to Baghdad. Instead, he provided him with a stipend and assigned a contingent of the palace guard, forcing him to reside in Egypt. As the result, This second Abbasid caliph in Egypt relinquished full control of state governance to Baybars. The caliphs in Egypt, their powers curtailed by Baybars, did not interfere in state politics. The re-establishment of the caliphate in Egypt aimed to leverage the caliph's religious influence while preventing any political interference with the sultans, as they had just received a fresh

reminder of why they shouldn't do that. By bringing the caliphate to his country, Baybars not only placed this office under his protection but also ensured that the caliphs remained distanced from the administration of the state. Following the termination of the Abbasid caliphate, Baybars' re-establishment of the caliphate in Egypt marked the transfer of the caliphate to the Mamluks. The caliphate remained in Egypt under the Mamluks until the Ottomans terminated the Mamluk State and seized the caliphate for themselves. Having the caliphate in Egypt significantly benefited the Mamluks, enhancing their influence over the Islamic world.

By reinstating the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt, Baybars did more than offer refuge to an Abbasid descendant; he effectively reasserted the historical continuity and religious legitimacy of his rule. This act of restoration served as a powerful statement to both his subjects and rivals, reinforcing his position as a legitimate ruler who not only prioritized the restoration of internal order and quelled rebellions but also positioned himself as a guardian of Islamic values and traditions in the face of external threats. Baybars' tenure was marked by an intelligent foreign policy with battles against states like the Mongols and Armenians, as well as the forging of alliances with others. His endeavors throughout his reign cemented his legacy as one of the Mamluk State's most distinguished sultans. In the upcoming installment we will cover Baybars' strategic alliance with Franks and Golden

Horde and his prowess in international politics and power projection. ✓

El Errante, interested in all things Turkic, posts on X @elerrantenomad



قائمة READING RECOMMENDATIONS



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neglecting it.**

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SHAYKH DR.
ABDALQADIR
AS-SUFI

RETURN
OF THE
CALIPHATE

INTRODUCED & ANNOTATED BY ASRAR RASHID



RIGEL
PUBLISHING



BAYT AL-ASAD

Reviving Islamic chivalry at their
physical roots



**QAWWAM
FITNESS**

WORDS: Isa Martell



ISA MARTELL gives an overview of a niche sport which not too long ago made up the fabric of male life.

There is something that stirs deep within the soul when a man picks up a sword for the first time. These iconic weapons hold a place of wonderment in our minds and souls and remind us of days long gone, ancient and outdated. However, such weapons also invoke attributes of courage, honor and dignity. You can feel this pump through your heart, as your hand wraps around their hilt. They have weight and balance, becoming an extension of your arm.

It's as if they silently scream to have a life of their own, calling to their bearer to engage with them. To strike, to cut, to pierce, and deflect. We dance in unison with the blade. Struggling to hold back their power, while they fight to be free from us. It is a delicate balance of give and take. Your life or your death.

Perhaps this is why we name them even, elevating their status as companions alongside us in conquest and adventure. They are as brutal as they are elegant. Sharp as they are sleek. Do not be fooled, they are designed to graphically end your fellow human being.

Buried in their cold spine is the memory of their fiery birth when they were formed from collected scraps and masses of iron. Rough pieces of ore which drifted through space for unknown millennia until they collided with Earth, descending from the heavens in the form of meteorites. An event

which Allah reminds us of in the Qur'an (18:96).

Space born particles, smelted. The sword's essence is primordial, from an eternity vast and unknown. After its baptism in the smelter, it is purer and more refined. It shows its soul to the smith, who understands its language. A wise smith can see how it wants to be shaped and forged. Over glowing coals, with heavy hammers, its beating begins. Hours. Days. Weeks. The finest blades endure the longest punishment in the fire before their temper is quenched. These become the swords that understand their purpose best.

I remember when I held a sword for the first time. It was a low-quality blade from the Pennsylvania Renaissance Faire. However, to me, like thousands of other young people, it was the greatest weapon I ever held.

I had no knowledge of types of swords, or what makes one better than another. All I knew was that swords looked cool, and holding one was invigorating. At the time, I was also yet to hear about Islam. This was back in the early nineties when I was still in my mid-teens. However something clicked deep within me when I held that sword, which set me to strive on a path that I hoped to walk my entire life, that ultimately being the pursuit of *futuwwah*.

In the beginning, I was drawn to the concept of Western Chivalry. All our books and entertainment promote this as the standard, the idyllic view of a European knight—the one they

force onto us to propagate their morals and ideas, falsely claiming it as their origin. While I don't like to use the word 'chivalry' due to these stereotypes, I use it here in the most general sense. I began to research aspects of this and participate in sword and armored combat groups that were available to me at the time. They were very fun and enjoyable, but the chivalry that I strived to live out was not what their behavior displayed. It was a lot of "role-play."

They were very brash, cliquish and fake. It turned me off, rather than drawing me to it. It was as if these people would act a certain way to show off or impress people in public, but then did not follow through with what I considered honorable behavior in private. I recognized that this culture was not one that I would fit in with, nor did I necessarily agree with it. It did not feel fulfilling in a spiritual way, and I realized that this is what I was seeking. That is, a deeper fulfillment. Some sort of harmony with the world around me. So, I continued to search this out.

Through the strands of divine fate, Allah guided me to Islam and I accepted the religion in 1997. After converting I persisted in searching for this idea of chivalry that I had and see if it was something which was inside the realm of the religion.

When reading about the early Muslims, I noticed what I was looking for. They were spiritual warriors. They kept a balance between the internal spiritual aspects of the religion and the external martial aspects. Unfortunately, up until a more recent time,

when you looked for something like this everything in English was under the context of 'Sufic Chivalry'. These books addressed esoteric spiritual matters, while completely leaving off anything to do with weapons or fighting in the real world. There weren't a lot of these books written by Muslims.

In the early 2000's, I traveled overseas and spent a few weeks in Morocco on vacation. I fell in love with the country, returned there a couple years later and lived there until 2009. The whole time I was there, I would try to search out things to do with swords in my free time. I met a lot of people, but sadly never came across any sort of weapons class, or teacher who specialized in that sort of thing. When I moved back to the United States I learned that a new niche was growing and gaining momentum—historical martialarts, of taking medieval manuscripts and using them to reconstruct swordsmanship.

This was being done in a Western context, but I also found Eastern sources starting to pop up. In 2013 an Iranian researcher named Manouchehr Khorasani published Persian Archery and Swordsmanship, a book about weapon techniques based largely from Safavid era manuscripts. It was very detailed and covered archery, swords, spears, axes, daggers and other weapons, as well as Persian wrestling techniques. It was just what I was looking for. For years I knew that due to the unique shapes of a lot of Middle Eastern weapons, they would for sure have different styles of fighting tailored to those differences. The research in this book backed this idea. I began training with it and

never looked back.

For the past ten years, the only sword I have trained with has been a shamshir. I have a full suit of handmade Ottoman armor which I train and fight in. I have been in numerous tournaments around the country, as well as taught seminars based on these weapons. This has recently led to the formation of Bayt Al-Asad, which is a group dedicated to researching medieval weapons, armor, and any related cultural artifacts of the Islamicate, then reconstructing them to the best of our abilities to better connect us with our spiritual heritage.

When it comes to our deen, I feel that this type of activity, though seems strange and niche to many, gives us access to a greater historical context whilst opening the door to deeper understanding of how our ancestors lived. The concept of futuwah is becoming more popular now and, and an increasing number of great guys are pushing to have our youth learn these things in Muslim communities around the world.

There are a number of aspects that various scholars have classified under futuwah, ten come from a hadith narrated by Imam Ja'far al-Sādiq (RA). They are truthfulness in speech, loyalty in oaths, fulfilling your trusts, abandoning lying, mercifulness to the orphans, giving to those who ask for help, spending on one who has, generosity to craftsmen and guests, and modesty.

If we strived to live by these traits alone, we would be superior men. This looks like a

simple task but no doubt it is difficult to maintain such a demeanor constantly. They need to be cultivated and developed over our lifetime, reflected upon at different stages of life, for as we get older we see the same things from new perspectives.




How does swordsmanship play into this? When we incorporate historical weapons training into our lives as another sport or exercise, we directly connect with our Prophet (SAW), and all previous generations of the Ummah pre-modernity. They carried swords as a fact of life, the way we incessantly carry around our smartphones. They knew what it meant to step up and meet your opponent face

to face. You must be a few paces out of arm's reach to wield such a weapon effectively. Your eyes lock as you test your skills. If this were an actual battlefield, such skills can lead to your death, if they are not as sharp as your blade's edge. These qualities affected every other facet of their life even outside of combat.

In training, practicing swords are dull and we wear protective gear. Sometimes we train and spar in armor. It is hot and sweaty. When you are not in shape, you struggle to breathe. People sometimes feel claustrophobic in their helmet. You can feel a sense of how nearly invincible you are wearing it.

Sometimes sparks fly off your armor from your opponent's weapon. You can smell it when it happens. Its full immersion and a developed set of skills. With them we can imagine how it was during battles in history, especially during Ramadan. If you are looking for a new connection to your deen, then I highly suggest finding someone who can lead you down this path as well. ✂



Isa Martell is a swordsman, artist, author, and co-founder of Bayt Al-Assad, a group that researches historical fighting techniques and culture of Muslim countries.

You can find him on X @strangermartell, and their patreon: (patreon.com/baytalasad)

Narrated Khalid bin Al-Walid:

On the day of Mu'tah, nine swords were broken, and only a Yemenite sword of mine remained in my hand. (Sahih al-Bukhari 4266)

THE MARTYRDOM OF 'UMAR

مَقْتَلُ أَمِيرِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ عُمَرَ بْنِ الْخَطَّابِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ



BY

ABDULLAH AL-RABBAT



ANCIENT THROWBACKS

"Those dumb Mahometans really thought they had a chance at Mu'tah. Don't they know we're the strongest regional power in Syria? The old monks say we're declining. If we're a dying empire why can we effortlessly project power all the way to Jordan?"

- Anonymous Byzantine Infantryman, 629 AD



**Did
you
know?**

**هل
تعلم؟**

Catholics consider the anniversary of the Battle of Lepanto, where the Holy League defeated the Ottomans at sea, to be a holy day with feasts.



**Strange,
considering the
Ottomans built an
even bigger navy
and captured
Cyprus the
following year.**

TEVYE'S TUNNEL




**AN INTERACTIVE
QAWWAM
MYSTERY!**


**WHERE ON EARTH
DOES RABBI TEVYE'S
TUNNEL GO?**

Rabbi Tevye has fallen into a strange tunnel under his synagogue. Can you help him make it to the end?



START





FINISH



Huh? That's strange...



audioIlm

Learn the Deen, on
the Go.

@TheRealDoy99



QAWWAM INTERVIEWS

A conversation with

IBN MAGHREB

@IbnMaghrebi



The paradigm shift post-October 7th, the roots of AGC, the post-WW2 civilizational narrative, the myth of Muslim diaspora exceptionalism, the Hijra debate, the American election, and more: a conversation with the esteemed anonymous poster Ibn Maghreb:

AY: Assalamu Alaykum Wa Rahmatullah. Hope you're doing great brother. I became familiar with your posts quite some time ago as I finally found myself immersed in what for a while I've been calling the "Alt-Muslim" sphere, the alternative to the infamous and rightfully hated "Muslim Twitter" filled with midwit thought that doesn't extend beyond millennial sexual frustration and gynocentric fart huffing. In truth, as I told another Qawwam brother the other day, there are probably a few hundred of us at best online right now, with the number only increasing to those who are spiritually aligned with us and specialize in some sort of niche but are largely ignorant of the depth of today's inhuman horrors.

I'm going to start by asking: many with myself included, even those of us who unbeknownst to the public are at very high levels of academia and political consultation, have been so struck with the ongoing crisis in Gaza since Oct. 7th that they feel that the beliefs they've held for decades are coming undone. Did you have a similar change in thinking in one aspect or another?

IM: Walaykum assalam — thanks for taking the time to chat and the feeling is

common theme that something has gone deeply wrong with the direction of travel within the Western Muslim diasporas over the last twenty years or so.

Yes, if I'm completely honest, although I have long held a view about the irredeemably anti-Islamic and Lahabite nature of American Empire, I cannot say that the developments following October 7th have not been disturbing. It has in many respects shaken my conviction in Sh. Abdal Hakim Murad's project about establishing a coalition of virtue, a sacred alliance so to speak amongst Abrahamic believers and secondly also about the existence of an ethical and principled Christian and Jewish peace constituency that is cognisant of the excesses of American Empire but also understands that fundamentally the Empire is quintessentially progressive and spiritually leftist. I'm open to changing my mind about it but the overwhelming evidence is that first of all, Christian and Jewish conscience, ethical cultivation and activity is all but exhausted and fatigued in the West — it is dead for all intents and purposes and whatever embers of it remain are deeply aligned for various

reasons with the Zionist project. The camps that are anti-Zionist have their deep-seated problems — namely that they have capitulated to all the central dogmas and principles of progressivism, which ironically ends up propping up the larger project of American Empire — in many respects they are useful idiots.

So definitely, my faith in the Muradian Project — a sort of convivial Abrahamic awakening in the wastelands of the post-secular West with an optimistic disposition and attitude that the Muslim presence can potentially be a catalyst for a positive and culturally enriching reforging and reformation of Western identity, that he is such a wonderful advocate for has waned. Of course I still encourage people to listen to what the Shaykh has to say and to listen carefully — he is an ocean of knowledge and a true shining gem for our communities, and the work he has done individually and also socially in terms of establishing an institution of higher Muslim learning in the West will inshAllah endure for generations.

However, I think October 7th definitely reveals the logical exhaustion of the Muradian Project that again eloquently prioritised good faith engagement, considered dialogue and patient excavation of a new animated Abrahamic sensibility for Western populations. These are of course wonderful personal traits and in themselves offer a virtuous training for the hearts and minds of a believer but they

are ultimately rendered futile in the face of belligerent and cunning enemies, if they are continuously channeled within the boundaries of "civic reason" and "democratic engagement". The theatre within which the Muradian Project tries to anchor itself in, is fundamentally broken and not fit for purpose.

What comes after the Muradian Project, which I just use as a shorthand for principled and conscientious Muslim engagement is something that I think at this moment, Muslims all over American Empire and its vassal states in the UK and Europe are discussing amongst themselves, and I'm not sure what will come out of it.


AY: I've long been a believer in the Muradian project as well, but nearly all semblance of that "hopium" and optimism were extinguished from my mind after seeing the concerted effort to protect AGC (Advanced Gay Civilization, my more general term for American Empire that's supplemented by it's treacherous aides) at any cost. It seems that at the end of the day, it all comes down to Friend vs. Enemy distinction, where arguing becomes an intellectual exercise that in the end is pointless because you both know there are foundational beliefs you both hold that are irreconcilable through mere speech, and thus reveals the utterly impossible nature of modern politics at large where warfare is selectively employed and encouraged/discouraged but never for the right reasons.

I don't know the full answer now, but in the

end when I think about the argument made primarily by religiously insane neoconservatives about the “war between Islam and West,” I find myself agreeing somewhat, but not for the reasons they claim. When I read Homer, Xenophon, etc. I find a rich and brutal history that tells of the foundations of a civilization that, though would define the West in later centuries, is a completely different dimension from what defines it now. Many cope and try and frame the aesthetics-obsessed and sexually vibrant culture of ancient Greece as liberal and cosmopolitan, but to any rational reader it comes off much differently — do you think the modern hatred of Islam, which now defines “the East” to them, has roots in these foundational aspects of their civilization? Or is it in aberration?

IM: There has always been a state of competition between various civilizations or civilizational zones in the past which I think naturally will impact and shape the way the "Other" is perceived and I don't necessarily begrudge that. I think historically speaking this competition opens up spaces particularly when we talk Islam that are both "Islamophobic" and "Islamophilic" — so on the one hand you will have someone like Schopenhauer, that poor miserable soul who had a particular antipathy towards Islam but equally you will have a spiritual genius like Goethe who appreciates the inner dimensions of what Islamicate civilization and spiritual

cultivation had to offer and becomes a participant in cultural exchange. So I think in some vague sense I do subscribe to Huntington's basic thesis of civilizational competition. I agree with you that the modern West as we understand it today under the shadow of Advanced Gay Civilization is no heir to the many different civilizational configurations in history that occupied the West. This is a new enemy that has "arrived from the Future" in the sense Nick Land talks about, to wage war on behalf of the Machine God — so the current hatred of Islam is based in something entirely different and new — it is not from Rome, Greece or even necessarily based on Christian zeal — this hatred has a new genealogy etc.




AY: It seems like a genealogy of cope if you ask me, one reinforced heavily with the desire to “regroup” as a civilization after the great destruction of two world wars, as well the capture of those nearly destroyed institutions by those who feel the world must repay them for a set of war crimes committed against many other groups; none of whom came with the same complaints. Many don’t know about the millions of German Balts or Balkan peoples who were also exterminated in World War 2, yet you don’t hear those people still beating the drum of invoking Anglo-Saxon guilt to reap benefits. More concerning to me, personally, was the genocide of more than seven million Muslims from lost Ottoman lands during the Russo-Turkish war and loss of the Balkans and Greece. Strangely today, you don’t hear any of their descendants mention this at all because more often than not they bought into the new civil religion that their massacred forefathers rejected. Within the West it’s the opposite — those decrying the massacres they experienced are those who brought the new civil religion and insist on it as it leads to a destruction in the quality of life at a very slow pace for hundreds of millions.

One of those things leading to this destruction is, seemingly, mass immigration. This is a sensitive topic among Muslim diaspora, but I wanted to see your take on it. Do you think most Muslims here even know what they’re talking about when it comes to evaluating the effects their presence has in Western lands?

IM: There definitely is a search for some new civilizational narrative after the ashes of two world wars. And regardless of how you feel about it, for better or for worse, American Empire has come to fulfill that absolutely gaping void. The establishment of that empire certainly began in the early 20th century with progressivism anchoring the foundations of what today we would call the administrative state which is euphemistically called the “deep state” by those feel uncomfortable with such a stringently technocratic and centralised form of governance and that type of technocratic rule has attracted a variety of critiques from various eclectic strands.

But I suspect what we see today in the struggle to define a new civilizational narrative or vision is not a culture war in the West, not at all. There are no fundamental competing visions of the good battling it out in a gladiatorial spectacle in the public square. That is a complete mythology. What we are instead seeing is pure intra-elite factionalism and intra-elite warfare. There is incredible cross-political consensus on some of the most absolutely fundamental building blocks of American Empire, namely the deep state with its technocratic organizations, central banking, technological/cybernetic corporate control with Big Tech, hyper-financialization and so on.



So what you end up with is this absolute farce of a spectacle where there are people who genuinely think that the type of cultural aesthetic that Elon Musk along with the rest of the PayPal Mafia (like Peter Thiel) have adopted is somehow in deep philosophical conflict with the governance agenda of the WEF and the Bill Gates crowd when fundamentally they represent two sides of the same coin, just with a different aesthetic wrapper. These are all technocrats who worship the Machine God.

Honestly, in many respects, the current moment that we are in, I have never seen such consolidated political consensus on the fundamental priorities that are clearly at play in maintaining the longevity of American Empire. We are currently in a moment where there is even less dissent than the post-9/11 moment, if that was even possible. There is a strong cross party consensus around stamping out financial privacy, digital rights, encryption and many other critical areas such as central banking and biotech (of which transgenderism is just the first iteration of what is to come). A lot of these seemingly disparate topics are deeply connected and intertwined.

Which brings me to your second question. This is a very delicate matter and I don't think there's been a proper reckoning about what our presence represents here and how our presence in

Western lands has evolved over the last few decades. And often I find because the people who are discussing this topic have a clear incentive to paint a rosy picture. I mean there are clear economic and social incentives now in terms of being an "activist" for particular religious and ethnic communities — AstroTurf activism is a lucrative business and peoples livelihoods depend on it.

And I want to discuss, for my part, mainly the state of the Muslim diaspora in the UK and to a certain extent this potentially could apply to continental Europe. And I think where we could potentially look at as a microcosm for this discussion are the French riots that happened last year.

I think the French riots demonstrated that Muslims have not attained a certain social, cultural mastery in terms of the way Houellebecq fantasizes about in his book *Submission*. We are not Houellebecqian dissidents living amidst dystopia. We have actually become deeply integrated; and the story of utter decay and decline that you see in white working-class areas in post-industrial Britain is also the story of Muslim Britain or Muslim France. I think the timing of migration is not causal. The timing of migration comes at a time when there was a complete hollowing out of the civilizational narrative and culture within Europe after the devastating impact of the two World Wars and the ensuing metastatic spread of cultural liberalism — essentially there was,

and even today there is nothing left to integrate into.

In effect, when the migrants came, they were confronted with an already fatigued, exhausted and quite frankly dying civilization that was on its last knees and now we're really seeing a sort of death rattle. And Muslim migration ends up actually being consumed by and repeating the same forms of cultural decay and decline of their host societies in effect "integrating into the system".

There is this myth of a particular kind when we look at British Muslims and you juxtapose them to American Muslims, there is this enduring and comfortable myth that we like to tell ourselves that British Muslims are somehow uniquely hyper resistant to liberalisation and the social effects of it, but quite frankly that is simply not the case.

Instead of what you see today is Muslim areas, particularly in Britain, deeply impoverished. And because of that material impoverishment, there is a culture of decay and inequity that in many ways mirrors the same cultural death occurring in white working-class areas which have become susceptible to brainwashing and propaganda by the billionaire class who are obfuscating the true roots of this incredibly dire set of circumstances. Muslim areas have significant challenges vis a vis crime — not random or sporadic but deeply systematic and organized forms of it such as the drug trade, gangsterism

and an inability to create beautiful prosperous civic spaces — so Bradford is just as dire and hopeless as Hartlepool.

The other great myth that particularly Muslim millennials and zoomers in Britain tell themselves is that they don't follow any particular culture, they "just follow Islam" and they buy into this Salafi delusion that you can create beauty in the absence of embodied cultural forms. However what has actually happened is because of the neglect of tackling the cultural question they just end up emulating the utter flatness of the monoculture of American Empire — midwit social activism, Instagram influencers, TikTok morons, algorithmic gaming to create media empires, hacking the attention economy. These are all very much a part and parcel of modern British Muslim cultural production.

So my whole view of Muslim migration is that we should stop looking at Muslim minorities as somehow exceptional or hyper-resistant or particularly virile or that they possess this irresistible vitalism that is impacting the cultural destiny of the West. Instead the vast majority of Muslims certainly in the UK have integrated into the hollowed out post-industrial and distressed urban monoculture of American Empire and done it rather well.

The truth is much more bleak — it is that Muslims are just like every other cultural and religious community bending the knee to the idol of the Machine god. And you can see this quite clearly in terms of the popular

forms of political advocacy in the Muslim diaspora in the UK which have predominantly for the last 20 years or so, veer towards the far left, who are just useful idiots for the Deep State.

The roots of Muslim migration to Europe and the United Kingdom were based on a very sort of cold monetary logic. They were effectively patterns of economic migration, not necessarily in terms of expanding the outposts of the Islamicate in new lands. There was no conscious concerted civilizational effort to spread Islam's borders in a way that would facilitate the emergence of a new cultural or theopolitical zone.

This isn't necessarily a critique, it's just a very blunt and descriptive way of looking at the whole phenomena of Muslim migration. And I can certainly say in the case of the United Kingdom, this is actually the crux of the story. And you can look at the reasons for why this economic migration was necessary. And I think that's fair. And there are certainly things that you could look at in terms of the impact of colonial rule and the sorry state of post-colonial Muslim political experience but ultimately it does come down to a transactional and economic grounding for migration.

AY: You're reminding me of the time I'd scandalized thousands of people in a tweet, especially delusional Muslims online, when I told them the French riots were indicative of

all you just described. Muslims in France, UK, or even the mythological "melting pot" of America are not special, they're just clients to a set number of people with malicious desires and plans more messed up than most working class Muslims have the capacity to imagine. Though I don't agree with my friend @sharghzadeh on absolutely everything, what I love about him is his main skill in posting where he shatters the delusions of these folks who spout insane pipe dreams like "Sharia being the future" in the West.

The only difference in the modern world, sadly, between Muslims in Arab or Asian states and Western ones is demographics. Arab Muslims today are clients of treacherous heretics who are indebted to the same banks Western leaders are, and much of why I remain unconvinced of the Hijrah argument is that the benefits you gain from "living in Muslim lands" today are not those reaped by being in a Muslim-ruled state that provides full political and social sovereignty to Sunni Muslims, as that no longer exists, but are instead benefits of mere coincidence and demographics — of living in a place where 90% of the population is Muslim — the lot of them toiling in the husk of an Islamicate built up by their ancestors. I felt this as a boy — I spent the first couple of years in schooling in an American public school filled with anxiety and the nagging of flustered neurotic school mummies, but my parents would soon send me off to a private Islamic school where I was brought great relief and comfort from being in a place with a masjid, where the other students and even teachers were

all Muslim, etc.

However, I was still being fed the same American education trash cocktail, and our school was still legally subjected to a certain curriculum. The same textbooks, same lies, same slightly Islamic imitations of Western school discipline. This is what this Hijrah argument sounds like to me, like wanting to flee to a system where you're subject to nearly the same kind of repressions as a kafir nation but are merely comforted by demographic likeness. Do you view the Hijrah argument the same way, what other merits could it possibly hold?

sentiments about Sharghzadeh that although he may shock a lot of people with his commentary, the underlying substance of what he is saying cannot really be challenged because it isn't really an assertion, more of a running time description and commentary of the state of affairs on the ground. And there have been others as well in this space who have found something deeply wrong with the way Islamic discourse has conducted itself over the last 20 years or so with the likes of Mobeen Vaid and Dr William Barylo's work which I don't fully agree with but I think he



Photo: France Riots, 2023, CNN

IM: I think a big part to blame for this for holding up this delusion of Muslim exceptionalism is this insidious and sprawling behemoth that I refer to as Dawah Inc. where all of the trappings and aesthetics of sterile left-wing activism and Youtuber culture has made its way into Muslim cultural spaces. I echo your

touches on a lot of these dysfunctional themes with some excellent ethnographic and anthropological research.

The fundamental problem that we currently have with the way the Muslim attention economy operates in the West is that unless you fervently uphold the myth of Muslim exceptionalism, you simply won't

have a media career. There is no audience for sober critique that you can monetize and "self merch" off which is a tad problematic for those who want to profit from their advocacy.

In terms of the Hijrah debate, I think it definitely has to now be revisited and re-looked at in the light of recent events. I don't think Hijra is the panacea or the magic bullet for a lot of the social ills that Muslim communities currently have in the diaspora. I think if anything, Hijra may very well just physically locate these problems to different environments rather than fix anything more meaningful at a deeper level. However, the advocacy of the likes of Sheikh Hasan Spiker (@RealHasanSpiker) and Sheikh Anwar (@movetomuscat) needs to be looked at more seriously and closely, because it is far from a foregone conclusion that there can be something like an authentically "British Islam" or "European Islam" certainly in the sense that the likes of Tariq Ramadan envisioned or that wonderfully memory holed movement in the 2000s in the UK — **The Radical Middle Way.**

And you have to also couple this with the background that the last ten to twenty years have been quite disillusioning in terms of the prospects of any meaningful political and social reform in the heartlands of the Islamicate. Erdoganism in Turkey really hasn't delivered a lot of the promises and the rhetoric that made everyone a very enthusiastic supporter for

the "Turkey model" in the mid 2010s.

Pakistan has now regressed to an unfathomably tragicomic police state with an incredibly corrupt and traitorous praetorian guard and the same description can apply to other such central heartlands such as Egypt, for example, and many parts of the Arab world.

I think if you consider Hijra, you really will be making it more from the standpoint of trying to protect some form of intergenerational Islamic virtue. I don't think anywhere in the world within the Islamicate there is a civilizational state that can anchor Muslim aspiration. I think in that sort of regard, if you're imagining you want to make a Hijra in terms of fulfilling an aspiration to revive in some corner of the Islamicate civilizational competence, you have to take a step back and aim for something a little bit more pragmatic and ultimately individualize on a personal level, which doesn't sound glorious but it is reasonable and more grounded at least.

AY: I want to move on to the American election later this year. In this issue there's a piece by myself where I argue for a complete abandonment of the democratic party for the purpose of pure political punishment and revenge against the "interfaith" phonies and those nominal Muslims who sought to establish a leftist-Muslim coalition for decades in the United States — all because, obviously, they betrayed us in such brazen and disgusting fashion after October 7th and went after the

genuine figures amongst us with the kind of vicious hatred unseen since the early 2000s. I distinctly remember Jewish and Evangelical American “religious figures” and accounts online who built up a good reputation with American Muslim communities for their friendliness and cooperation for civil rights causes in the past absolutely lose their minds on their public social medias the second week of October, frothing at the mouth as they called for Israel to exterminate all of Gaza.

We’re conducting this interview just a few days after Biden lost the city of Dearborn by a 6% margin in the primaries — something unprecedented for an incumbent running in a Democrat stronghold county for decades. I don’t want to repeat my thesis here, but it’s basically down to this: the figurehead president in charge doesn’t solely determine American kowtowing for Israel (recall the Republican morons who think the Abraham Accords were the sole creation of Trump’s genius), so let’s use this election to at least cause a ruckus within the counties where our vote is consequential. Muslims in New York, for example, even if they were to entirely vote Trump would be rendered irrelevant by the fact they live in an entirely faggotized Democrat state that votes 20+ points that way every election. This isn’t the case for Midwest and Southern state Muslims. I know you have a unique view on this, so I wanted to ask you about it here. Knowing everything we just discussed, is this even worth doing for the long term?

IM: I think on this particular issue I have a distinct view of looking at Muslim electoral political activity within American Empire. I start off with a very basic premise that all of the vassal states within the American Empire are inherently hostile to any authentically anchored expression of Islamic political advocacy, which is rooted in Sharia and Revelation. And I don't think that's a particularly groundbreaking view to hold, I think that's just common sense.

I also share the view that the policies of the American Empire are not coming from the superficial layer of electoral politics that we see, not just in the imperial heartland of Washington, but across all of the other important provinces such as the United Kingdom and France. Ultimately these policies are generated, from what Francis Fukuyama would call as the semi-permanent super structure of the liberal project which is the administrative state or what critics would euphemistically call the deep state.

It's really important for Muslims to understand that policy genesis doesn't occur at the site of electoral politics. It occurs at this much deeper base layer of the administrative state, which consists of a range of civil service organs, think tank institutions, technocratic organizations, military assets and the sprawling expansionary intelligence or alphabet agency apparatuses — all of these have a symbiotic relationship between private and


public sector. In fact the public v private sector distinction is for all intents useless and no longer coherent — it's all blurred. These policies from the administrative state are then transitioned into the public sphere through incredibly sophisticated forms of cognitive warfare, attention economy hacking, psychological operations and media warfare to manufacture democratic consent.

So you have to understand that the direction of the empire is dependent on the smooth running and effective evolution of the base layer of the empire, which is the administrative state. The only figures within the American Empire that even have an inkling or an interest in rolling back the administrative state and also dismantling the Empire peacefully so that the whole American project, the whole American experiment can go back to being what it was originally thought up to be, which was a constitutional framework of limited government are the likes of Ron Paul and Thomas Massey who have no real influence today and are isolated.

So this outlines my initial premise that both Democrats and Republicans, even the Trumpian version of it, are part of a larger uni-party that are all interested in sustaining the base layer of the American Empire, even though they might have very strong disagreements about the way this is done. Strong, intra elite factionalism and strong cultural disagreements within the

ruling class should not be mistaken for dissidence and it shouldn't be mistaken for reform. The likes of Balaji and Mearsheimer, even though these figures and many others like them today form the saner aspects of the American imperial commentariat, all of them are fundamentally interested in prolonging the longevity of the American empire, they are just going about it in a different way. And the same goes for

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the so-called "dissident sphere", including the likes of BAP and so on. They are all fundamentally interested in prolonging the project of American Empire.

Based on all of this, my reading is that currently the Democrats are practicing a form of empire which served them well during the late 20th century when American power was at its peak as a unipolar entity. However, the world is changing, and it's

changing fast. The Democrats have always been the most faithful servants of American empire, and by faithful I mean the most intelligent, the most driven, the most ambitious, and the most ruthless. However, we now live at a very important historical moment where all of the successes that the Democrats had in the past for sustaining American empire are now starting to culminate in arrogance, imperial fatigue, over-extension, hubris, and individuals like Trump recognized this. What Trump represents is a romanticised sentimental version of trying to rein in Democratic indulgences for the sake of protecting what is left of the Empire so that it can extend into the next century. This is the core of MAGA.

And historically speaking, this is nothing new. Imperial fatigue, empires overextending themselves, overstretching themselves, lapsing into hubris and arrogance, is very cliché.

The current Democrat part of the elite, what Balaji calls the blue tribe, and there is a red tribe as well (plus gray tribe), both of them represent competing priorities, different sides of the same elite, but the blue tribe, I believe, are accelerating and potentially providing the catalysts for American decline. Culture war alienation at home, military of extension abroad, monetary delusions, accelerating the fiat standard, overestimating the power projection of American military forces abroad, underestimating the internal

public revulsion for open conflict domestically — the Blue Tribe is taking the Empire towards the abyss.

So my argument is why would you interrupt your enemy when they're in the middle of making a mistake? And I want to back this up by providing a historical precedent that in the United Kingdom after the Iraq War, the community spent 10 years wasting resources, capital and time by trying to "punish" mainstream parties — it doesn't work, it has no lasting influence.

The other thing that is key to the longevity of American Empire is the illusion that electoral politics is responsive to the public mood. A Biden victory would fundamentally shatter that illusion and set off a chain of internal domestic reactions that would be hugely unpredictable. But in that unpredictability lies a chance at destabilizing the engine room and Imperial core. Americans losing faith in the electoral process and losing faith in the vote and democracy is a very important prerequisite in terms of seeing the end of American power. We know these are delusions, but these are important cultural delusions that allow, for instance, the greatest expansion of surveillance in the history of man, which people voted in and democratically permitted to happen.

A Biden victory would create unprecedented levels of alienation, frustration and domestic unrest that would ultimately accelerate imperial fatigue and accelerate internal discord.

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A Biden victory would cause unparalleled culture war accelerationism, citizens turning against each other as states within the union do. And fundamentally the democratic glue that binds the empire starts to be shaken and starts to unravel. Balaji has already mentioned that the country is already partitioning itself along the lines of blue tribe and red tribe, in terms of where people are choosing to live. It is my belief that a loss for the red tribe at this particular moment in time would accelerate that splintering, that partition process that Balaji has talked about.

There will never be a peaceful resolution or peaceful internal reform of American empire, that time has passed and it is delusional thinking that Americans would voluntarily pack up the empire and go back to being a Madisonian republic. That is simply not going to happen. To see the end of such tremendous power you will have to see tremendous fitna. There is no left or right within American Empire. All of the live political players within the Empire are progressives. The "Republicans" are simply progressives with a 10-year time-lapse. They will eventually come around to the same political platform and the same

program because the Democrats actually, or well, the part of the elite that have Democrats' sensibilities are the ones historically associated with innovating the cutting edge of expanding empire.

And what is fundamentally undeniable since the War on Terror and since 9/11 is that on both sides of the Atlantic actually, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, both parts of the Uniparty, the Labour/Democrats, the Republican/Conservatives, both of them pursued agendas that were absolutely deadly to any aspirations of Islamicate Sovereignty.

There has to be an understanding that at this moment in time, as I've said before and I'll continue to say this, there is incredible united cross-political consensus on the fundamental building blocks of the primacy of American power which is predicated on the monetary and fiscal framework that Michael Hudson has described beautifully in Super Imperialism, the rapid expansion of surveillance architectures and technocratic governance. There isn't really a space for Muslims amidst all this, so adopting the framework of picking the part of the elite that will accelerate imperial fatigue is the natural avenue. You can do this in multiple ways not just electorally through voting but that is a separate discussion altogether.

And some of the motivations behind Muslims wanting to "punish" certain electoral parties and actors comes out of a

very misplaced sense of sentimentalism about the democratic process and a naivety that our votes will actually shift the bedrock of policy making. Despite everything that's happened since the Gaza genocide, I still think there are a lot of Muslims who generally feel that the West in its current configuration is still "home" and can be "saved" and "reformed". That's wishful thinking and those sentiments need to be pushed aside.

AY: Well this is pretty blackpilling. In truth, I don't really disagree with any of this, but my rationale is that for the time being Muslims in America especially aren't prepared for the bloody violence that kind of accelerationism would incur, so at least a Trump victory (which is very likely, from what I'm seeing, unless massive cheating happens once again and your scenario is triggered regardless) would buy us some time. Parallel to that, I'm not super depressed by the idea of "going back" if I had to, as long as I have full access to espressos and an internet connection. I feel like in terms of "first world luxuries" those are modest requests. I said in jest to a friend the other day, that even if Muslims tried to flee en masse, many would find that they had no one that wanted them. Arab and Asian world tyrants have pretty much gotten the image at this point that Muslim Westerners are either aspiring Islamists who hate them or libtard revolutionaries. I'm assuming you also believe Muslims wouldn't see the signs and just get steamrolled by what's around them regardless?

IM: The ideal scenario, if you can even say that, is that Trump actually wins quite convincingly, and it's obvious to any observer who is impartial, but the administrative state manufactures the vote to such a degree that Biden ends up winning. Another possible scenario that would be quite interesting is if somehow Trump is barred from running at some point during the process, and someone like Nikki Haley takes the helm of the Republicans, I think truthfully that would be absolutely crushing. A Nikki Haley presidency would be a true gift.

The question whether this would spark off bloody violence domestically is an unpredictable one. I don't think one can confidently say that violence would occur on such a national scale so quickly. The caveat to what I outlined is that there is an incredible resilience to the American administrative state that cannot be underestimated. After all, we have been hearing about the decline of the US since at least the 90s and it has defied its critics by continuing to demonstrate and project strength.

The argument behind the accelerationist thesis is not geared towards violence per se as a goal, it's geared towards unpredictability and uncertainty.

Coming to your question, as a general rule I think the Muslim normie mainstream today are even more clueless about what's happening around them than compared to the post 9/11 period and prior to the War on Terror.

To give you an example we just had an important election in Rochdale, which is a hopelessly bleak town in the United Kingdom, but it has a significant Muslim population, about 30-40%. And the Muslims of that town instead of fielding an independent MP which is possible in a parliamentary electoral system that we have in the UK, decided in their infinite wisdom to go with the Workers' Party of Britain as their "protest vote" with George Galloway who is a professional fraud. My timeline is full of deluded fools clapping like seals and patting themselves on the back for this noble achievement. That sums it all I think.

AY: That leaves a lot to meditate on. Final question, would you be upset with me if QAWWAM became a mega corp?


IM: Only if I don't have a position on the board.

AY: Good to know. Assalamu Alaykum, be well my friend!

IM: Walaykum assalam.



Ibn Maghreb is an online writer interested in tech, the rise and fall of regimes, intellectual Islamic history and everything related. He posts @IbnMaghrebi on X, and you can find more of his writing @TheIqraFiles on Listed.





Selim in Egypt - Gloya Borski

ABDULLAH YOUSEF



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LEVANT




My name is Bashir Basri. I'm 27 years old. I believe in taking care of myself, and a balanced diet and rigorous prayer routine. In the morning, if I wake up in a state of impurity, I'll perform ghusl as I brush with my miswak. After I finish my purification, I use a 100% halal ingredient deep pore cleanser lotion. Still in the shower, I use a Zamzam water-activated gel cleanser. Then a honey musk body scrub. And on the face and beard, an exfoliating gel scrub. Then apply an herb mint facial mask, which I leave on for 10 minutes while I prepare the rest of my routine. I always use a beard oil with little or no seed oils, because seed oils make you gay. Then moisturizer, then Kuhl around my eyelids followed by a powerful oud fragrance, then I pray Fajr and Sunnah. There is an idea of a Bashir, some kind of abstraction, but there is no haram me. Only a suspicion, something illusory. And though I can forget to lower my gaze sometimes, and you can shake my hand and feel flesh gripping yours and maybe you can even sense our lifestyles are probably comparable, I am simply not a kafir.



QAWWAM FINANCIAL




The transparent series on
Islamic finance



THE CONSEQUENCES OF RIBA

WORDS: Muslim Bitcoiner
(@MBitcoiner)



In the next installment of our financial section, Muslim Bitcoiner continues off his first essay in issue one where he discussed the history of usury:



In our previous essay in the first issue of Qawwam, we briefly went over how Riba manifests itself within the current global monetary system. We demonstrated how interest-based lending is involved in the production and distribution of money both at the commercial bank and central bank levels. We also noted that Muslims need to understand the reality of Riba in the current global financial system before haphazardly looking for solutions. However, before entertaining solutions, it's first necessary to understand the consequences of the presence and pervasiveness of Riba in our money.

As a side note, we recognize that Riba encompasses more than just “interest” or “usury”, and there are different types of Riba. While these distinctions are useful for understanding the nature of Riba itself, it is not necessary for the present discussion, as “interest” will suffice in understanding Riba’s widespread negative effects on society.

Recall from the first essay that, under the current fractional reserve banking system, Riba is inextricably tied to debt issuance, and hence, money creation. Therefore, in almost all instances, we can equate the process of central banks and commercial banks creating fiat money to Riba. Essentially, fiat money can be called “institutional usury”, as Jörg Guido Hülsmann notes in his book, *The Ethics of Money Production*. This point will prove useful in the discussion below, as the negative effects of fractional reserve banking

are necessarily caused by the usury operating at the base layer of fiat money. But before venturing further, we first need to understand the concept of time preference.

Time Preference

The inherent scarcity of time compels individuals to make continuous choices throughout their lives, and this introduces what’s called “opportunity cost” that comes with each decision where we can only choose one action at the expense of other actions that would have taken place. We know that once an action is taken, we cannot go back to reverse it. We also know time is uncertain; Allah can end our life at any moment, and he tests us with trials that increase this uncertainty. But as Muslims, we know that the occurrence of death is a certainty, Allah (SWT) says in Surah Al-Anbiya verse 35 in the Quran:

كُلُّ نَفْسٍ ذَائِقَةُ الْمَوْتِ ۗ وَنَبْلُوكُم بِالشَّرِّ وَالْخَيْرِ فِتْنَةً ۗ وَإِلَيْنَا تُرْجَعُونَ

Every soul will taste death. And We test you 'O humanity' with good and evil as a trial, then to Us you will 'all' be returned.

Because of the opportunity cost and uncertainty associated with the nature of time, we can assume, all else being equal, that man prefers the present over the future, and of course this ratio varies from person to person. The ratio of preferring present consumption

and satisfaction over future consumption and satisfaction is called ‘time preference’, or the rate at which the future is discounted. So a short-term thinking person who prefers to enjoy satisfying his present needs and desires is someone who has ‘high time preference’, and conversely, someone who is long-term thinking and prefers satisfying his future needs and desires is someone who has ‘low time preference’.

What’s important to understand about time preference is that it’s always positive; it can never truly approach zero, or be negative. Conceptually, this makes sense, as we’re always discounting the future to some degree since we live in the present and we’re constantly taking purposeful actions each moment. However, as Muslims, we should always strive to lower our time preference as much as possible. After all, we are not living for the satisfaction or enjoyment of this present life, but for a life to come afterward.

This concept of time preference is critical to understanding human actions and conditions in modernity, and it directly influences people’s dispensation to save and allocate capital and resources for the future. Without the high time preference influence of the Shaitan and his minions, humanity naturally gravitates and marches towards a process of lowering time preference. This natural process of humanity’s advancement toward lowering time preference is what Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in ‘Democracy: The God that Failed’, calls a “process of civilization.”

Therefore, we could say that the continuous lowering of time preference, economically speaking, is at the center of the development and advancement of civilization. As we’ll see in the next section, the institution of usury and banking actually heavily influence people’s time preferences, thus affecting all aspects of civilization.

Consequences of Riba

As of the time of writing, the United States is currently 34.2 trillion dollars in debt, and the yearly payments on the interest of this debt is quickly approaching a staggering 1 trillion dollars. The US, along with nations that hold on to US treasuries, are on a path of constant debt issuance and a consistent policy of monetary supply expansion. We don’t need to show a chart illustrating this fact; everyone instinctively knows that the central banks all around the world are printing money. In light of the discussion above, we must ask ourselves, knowing that Riba is the main driver in the production and distribution of our money system, how does this Riba-induced monetary supply expansion affect people’s time preferences?

Firstly, it should be noted that money, being the most salable and liquid good, is the main tool people use for saving wealth. Imagine trying to transport wealth temporally over the next 20 years using iron or wood. These commodities would rot or degrade over time, making them less ideal for saving wealth, and one would need to find someone who needed these materials for exchange. In addition,

commodities like wood or iron are very easy to make more of, which makes them poor stores of value. Thus, money, given its high degree of salability across space and time, is the perfect technology that allows humanity to continue their natural progression of decreasing time preference.


So what happens when the money supply is expanded? As more money floods the system, the purchasing power of each unit diminishes, thus devaluing the money held by savers. This devaluation incites a general increase in prices across the economy as a whole, engendering a situation where a surplus of money pursues a diminished quantity of goods. Consequently, consumers experience a decline in their purchasing power, leading to a pervasive sense of increased instability and uncertainty going into the future.

If people expect their money to devalue over time, this will inevitably lead to the prioritization of spending rather than saving. Why save money when the prices of goods and services will just end up increasing? Rationally, under this scenario, it makes sense to spend the devaluing money as soon as possible on goods that can be consumed for immediate gratification, because that money will not hold its value through time. In essence, under a debasing currency regime, individuals are incentivized to live high time preference lifestyles, where spending for short-

term satisfaction and lavishness are encouraged and even glorified over prudent and judicious long-term satisfaction. Individuals are incentivized by the banking sector to open up new credit lines and borrow irresponsibly. The high-time preference individual is only concerned with his immediate gratifications, and, living in the moment, he does not concern himself with the debt that must be paid off. Of course, this debt grows through the abomination of compound interest. These incentives created by a Riba-infested debasing currency propel individuals to prioritize spending and debt accumulation with little regard to future outcomes and consequences.

This short-termism also extends to the business sector, where the effects are more severe and have far-reaching impacts on the economy as a whole. Typically, in the absence of Riba money, it is the role of the capitalist to allocate resources and adjust business practices in response to market signals. His priority is to utilize the profits from the business in the accumulation, preservation, and nurturing of capital to help the business grow and turn out higher quality and cheaper goods and services. The capitalist must exhibit low time

preference to successfully run a business. But under a depreciating currency regime, the incentives propel the capitalist to increase his time preference and adopt a short-term strategy. He no longer prioritizes the accumulation of capital, because now his priority has shifted. The operating costs



of his business have now increased as a result of monetary supply expansion. To cover his costs, the capitalist must now prioritize the maximization of revenue as opposed to the accumulation, preservation, and nurturing of his capital. The profit from his business is no longer used to grow his capital stock. He is incentivized to get into debt to finance his operating costs, and he needs his profit sooner rather than later. To turn out quicker profits, he can cut corners in the production process to speed up production and use lesser quality materials and resources in the construction of his products without alerting his customers of the resulting quality degradation. Much like the incentives observed at the individual level, businesses tend to operate in a high-time preference fashion. The priority now is to seek short-term profits over long-term sustainability and growth.

This short-termism is exacerbated by easily accessible and cheap credit. It no longer becomes necessary to even focus on profit or capital for the business; the capitalist will now focus his efforts on securing low-interest rate debt. But doesn't the capitalist eventually have to pay back this debt with interest? Of course, but now the capitalist adopts the same mentality as the banker whom he secured the loan from. Why put in the hard work to earn a profit when the capitalist can just earn interest from his business? This trend should sound familiar to the reader, as most large retailers in today's economy offer and heavily promote lines of

credit. Most large clothing retailers in the US, such as JCPenney and Macy's offer credit cards. Amazon and Walmart offer credit cards. Even tech companies like Apple offer credit cards. Why and how did this trend happen? This is one of the many high-preference incentives caused by the high-modernist policy of Riba-induced fiat money. Saifedean Ammous, in his other book, *The Fiat Standard*, explains this phenomenon as "interest rate arbitrage:

"Under the fiat standard, every business model degenerates into interest rate arbitrage. The purpose behind setting up business is increasingly less about making money from serving customers but establishing a creditor relationship with them. Managing to secure debt at a lower interest rate becomes the most significant market advantage. Businesses live and die by their ability to turn over debt at a healthy arbitrage."

Under normal circumstances in an unhampered free market, businesses that are no longer profitable naturally die out, and this allows for other budding startups to eventually replace the unprofitable and mismanaged established companies. This is a natural market process, as it allows new startups to competitively and fairly thrive and grow in the marketplace as they can provide cheaper and higher quality goods and services. But because the Riba money induced high time preference and the pursuit of profit through leverage and arbitraging interest rates rather than capital accumulation and utilization, businesses can still survive, even if they're technically not profitable. Access to cheap Riba money increases the prevalence of

these unprofitable businesses as they're able to accumulate more and more debt to finance their fiscally irresponsible practices. These businesses are known as "zombie companies". Seb Bunney, in his book *The Hidden Cost of Money*, explains the nature of these companies:

"A zombie company is a business that cannot support itself financially but continues to operate through debt accumulation. These still-functioning but debt-dependent businesses play a critical role in disrupting the natural flow of capital. A lack of financial viability in a company often indicates that its product or service fails to generate sufficient revenue to cover operational expenses or that the company has been financially irresponsible, rendering it unable to meet its debt obligations."

Under this regime, developing startups must now also expend time and resources to compete with these zombie companies, which stifles innovation and makes it difficult for startups to thrive and prosper.

And this leads to another potential problem concerning the incentives for fiscally irresponsible behavior. Consider that, once a business gets large enough, it has the guarantee of always receiving cheap credit and always getting bailed out. This creates a phenomenon known as "moral hazard". Operating a business with fiscal irresponsibility, short-term goals, and unethical practices is met with increased debt, whereas operating a business in a fiscally responsible, long-term, and ethical manner

goes unrewarded. This moral hazard creates incentives for businesses to operate in the most unethical and most short-sighted way possible, as long as the consequences can be covered up. This also creates the incentive for businesses to cooperate in ways that perpetuate and accelerate this recklessness, such as lobbying for regulation to stifle market competition, or securing more subsidies. This cooperation is especially prevalent in the banking sector, which is the first sector to always get bailed out during financial crises. Jörg Guido Hülsmann, in his book, *The Ethics of Money Production*, illustrates why bankers cooperate to perpetuate this moral hazard:

"It follows that, under fractional reserve banking, the bankers have a particularly great personal incentive to support fellow bankers in times of a redemption crisis. If they cannot extinguish the fire right where it shows up first, it risks spilling over to their own establishment. Thus they are likely to help out fellow bankers in difficulties. And they are the more likely to be so inclined, the more they themselves operate with low cash reserves.... the less responsible bankers know that this incentive exists on the part of their colleagues. They know that the other bankers will pay part of the bill if they, the imprudent ones, make bad decisions. There is therefore a special temptation for them to inflate their note issues in an especially reckless manner."

Of course, not every company and bank gets bailed out. As it gets more and more difficult for prudent and debt-averse companies to compete with Riba-funded companies, they eventually go bankrupt, and they end up getting bought out

(with leverage) by the Riba-funded companies. This leads to the consolidation and centralization of bigger and bigger businesses that end up turning into “too big to fail” corporations. This effect of the toxic centralization to mega-corporations is further exacerbated now that banks are less likely to consider issuing loans to new startups, as these are considered risky investments. So banks are more likely to issue loans to large corporations, often at a discount with low-interest rates, that allow these corporations to rapidly expand more than they otherwise would be in the absence of Riba money. Also, as these corporations expand and achieve “too big to fail” status, it is quite literally impossible for them to go completely bankrupt and fail, especially when one considers the hundreds of thousands of jobs that are at stake. So the central bank is more likely to bail out these large and unprofitable corporations, which creates a moral hazard, as has been discussed above.


Overall, the aforementioned economic effects of Riba money cultivate a high-time preference culture of rent-seeking. Market participants, especially in the banking and corporate sectors, pursue rent-seeking positions that do not add any actual value to customers. The goal is to pander to some authority, usually, bureaucratic compliance mandated by some government agency, and prioritize acquiring cheaper Riba-laced debt to finance their positions. Examples of these types of rent-seeking positions include HR officers, tax specialists, public relations

specialists, and any position related to Environmental and Social Governance, or ESG as it’s commonly called. Jimmy Song in his wonderfully titled book, *Fiat Ruins Everything*, expands on the nature of these rent-seeking positions, and why they’re sought after:

“For rent seekers, there’s a lot to love about these jobs. They’re generally easy to perform, hard to get fired from as they’re often mandated by law, and pay well, especially relative to the amount of value they add, which is to say none. Moreover, there are no fickle customers to satisfy, innovations that displace these positions, or even competitors to worry about. The only people who need to be appeased are the ones in charge, and as long as you stay within their good graces, your job is secure. Rather than fulfilling a market need, rent seekers cater to an authority, which usually translates to less real work. The economics of rent seeking boil down to the fact that someone is printing the money to support them, that is, the masses are being stolen from to fund them.”


These Riba-induced high-time preference incentives ultimately culminate in all market participants getting levered up to an absurdly extreme degree. If you’re the owner of a company, and your competitors are completely levered and you aren’t, you will likely be outcompeted, as your competitors have access to cheap capital and higher profit margins, and you do not. To survive, you will be pressured, especially from high time preference shareholders, to take on an unsustainable debt load, all in the name of boosting “growth”. To summarize, the Riba-induced global monetary supply policy leads to an increase in

time preference and the pursuit of short-term gratification. This results in individuals spending and consuming more rather than prudently saving and preparing for the future, including the hereafter. The market gets completely distorted where businesses are incentivized to get into interest-bearing debt, which causes the overall business strategy to prioritize revenue maximization over the accumulation, preservation, and nurturing of capital. Riba money also introduces market distortions including the increase in the prevalence of profiting from interest rather than selling goods and services, the increase of moral hazard, unfair competition, more rent-seeking, and the obsession over “growth” that leads to overall capital destruction.

We’ve only scratched the surface of the harmful effects of institutional Riba. In the next essay Insha-Allah, we will explore Riba’s second-order effects that include the degradation of food quality, environmental destruction, family decline, decrease of religiosity, and the increased prevalence of wars, among other effects. 

Muslim Bitcoiner is the co-founder of Bitcoin Majlis, and can be found on X @MBitcoiner





**Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger
(ﷺ) as saying: Fasting is a shield.
(Sahih Muslim 1151)**



Always has been.

**Wait, it's just one big
Hallaqian paradox?**






Humpty Dumpty sat in a tank,
Humpty Dumpty heard a great clank,
All the rabbi's doctors and all the rabbi's men,
Couldn't pump Humpty's semen again!


The **PILL** that made a man out of Mahmoud!



@MajestyandBeauty



What was it?



HAMZA YUSUF'S

WORDS:

SH. ANWAR MANGAL

JIHAD

ANTIDOTE

سعد بن أبي وقاص: "كان أبي يعلمنا المغازي والسرايا، ويقول: يا بني هذه شرف آبائكم فلا تضيعوا ذكرها" – شرح الزرقاني على المواهب اللدنية بالمنح المحمدية

SA'AD IBN ABI WAQQAS: "OUR FATHER USED TO TEACH US ABOUT THE BATTLES AND RAIDS [OF THE PROPHET ﷺ], AND USED TO SAY; MY SON, THIS IS THE HONOR OF YOUR ANCESTORS, SO DO NOT LOSE ITS MEMORY."

AL 'INDIYA: A REFUTATION OF SHAYKH HAMZA'S "ANTIDOTE" TO WARFARE IN THE SĪRAH LITERATURE:



Recently a friend approached me with a lecture titled "The Sīrah and Warfare" by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, which he had been given access to by a student at Zaytuna College. It was released on October 16 but seems to have been recorded earlier. The student felt uncomfortable with much of the content and wanted a second opinion. Below are my notes on the lecture. This is Part 1 of a 2 Part series being published here exclusively. Shaykh Hamza's general stance on jihād gathered from the numerous scattered statements over the decades is very problematic from a traditional perspective; but since October 7, many have found his words especially insensitive, and some of his remarks indefensible if they are meant to represent traditional Islamic teachings rather than something else entirely. But again, as always, he comments in such a haphazard manner that his supporters will always be able to say that he has been taken "out of context." Here, finally, we have a long lecture where he could articulate his views on all the issues with more than sound bites. This was a chance to put his detractors out of business and his supporters at peace. But what follows has been in line with the general agreement

of his detractors (of the sincere kind) and a burgeoning number of former supporters, that Shaykh Hamza is promoting a brand of "traditional" Islam that is historically and textually unrecognizable.

The purpose of this writing is not to say anything novel that has not already been said about Shaykh Hamza's apparent tilt to what some call Sufi Madkhalism. I am commenting in real time as I hear Shaykh Hamza make a case for his understanding of warfare in the sīra. One thing that becomes immediately clear is that Shaykh Hamza increasingly engages in what is called "looking for the keys under the lamp post", also known as the streetlight effect, a type of observational bias. He wants the sīra to be a certain thing, namely something that does not challenge his own pacifist inclinations, and that he can also present to his non-Muslim friends without the embarrassment of needing to challenge their prejudices, and then goes around looking for sources that support his presuppositions. I leave it to the readers to make their own judgment.

In the transcription, I have removed tangential comments not relevant to the central points being made. For our purposes we start when Shaykh Hamza starts reviewing Martin Ling's Life of Muhammad ﷺ:

HY: *The Arabic that he based it on is of Ibn Hishām [...] Now my criticism of it is not a criticism of Dr. Lings but a criticism of our sīra literature in general which is the focus on warfare. If you read this book you will feel like this is all the Prophet ﷺ was doing was fighting, and this is something that much of our literature has. There's so much in the battles and on the ghaṣawāt and so, unfortunately, that's the idea that people get — that there's constant warfare — and this is a problem. So, what I wanted to do [today] is provide an antidote to that, to look at the sīra and warfare but before I do that, I want to recommend a few books.*

This ‘criticism of our sīra literature in general’ comments slipped in here casts a big vote of no-confidence on the integrity of ulema and scholarly tradition. The sīra literature was penned by some of the most righteous ulema in all the ‘ulūm. The authors of the likes of al-Shifā’, al-Mawāhib, al-Halabiyya, al-Shāmiyya, alongside so many of the hundreds of commentaries and super commentaries, all men who are widely considered awliyā’ of this ummah. To teach that there was something so fundamentally deficient in the way our scholars covered the sīra and to think that in the 21st century one is going to finally provide an “antidote” to it, is a tremendously dangerous statement.

Shaykh Hamza then goes on to recommend a series of books in English. What stands out in this list is Juan Cole’s Muhammad: Prophet of Peace Amid Clash of Civilizations. He says about the book:

HY: *This is arguably one of the most important books I have ever read on the sīra. This book completely changed my perception of the sīra.*

We will revisit this book later. But keep the above statement in mind while you read what now transpires. The above revelation is not insignificant.

HY: *[...] and then in Arabic there are many, my personal favorite is Zayni Dahlan’s abridgment of the Sīrah al-Halabiyya...but my favorite is the Sīrah al-Halabiyya and I wish somebody would do a critical edition of it because it's just a stunning book.*

Shaykh Ahmed Zayni Dahlān’s book is not an “abridgement” of the al-Halabiyya, although it was originally written as marginalia on the al-Halabiyya. Rather it should be considered an independent work that summarizes some of the most important texts in Sīrah literature. In Shaykh Ahmed Zayni Dahlān’s words:

“After Allah facilitated me the reading of a number of commentaries of the Shifā’, and al-Mawāhib and its commentary by al-‘Allāma al-Zarqānī, and going over other sīra books like the sīra of Ibn Sayyid al Nas, and Ibn Hishām, and al-Halabiyya — as these are the most authentic books penned in this regard — I thought of writing a summary of what comprised of his blessed sīra from the miracles which proves the truthfulness of the call of the Best of Creation.....and these matters are the greatest causes of the strengthening of Iman.”

Interestingly, the book deals less with the

mu‘jizāt – as it sets its main purpose in the preface – and primarily covers the ghazawāt – warfare! Dahlan’s book – as published by Dār al-Qalam al-‘Arabiyya, Halab, in three volumes – runs to over a thousand pages. In Part One, the topic of ghazawāt starts from page 353 and runs to page 415, the entirety of Part 2 is primarily focused on the ghazawāt, some 372 pages. So, 425 of 1120 pages are about ghazawāt that took place during the time of the Prophet ﷺ! The specific treatment of the mu‘jizāt takes place at the end of Part 3 and runs to 210 pages.

So, the question is why would Shaykh Dahlān claim his work to be primarily about mu‘jizāt and then write about it less than the ghazawāt? The answer is that some of the greatest mu‘jizāt of the Prophet ﷺ appear through the ghazawāt, which Shaykh Dahlan enumerates as he writes.

HY: Another incredible sīra is the Shifā’ of which there is a translation in English. This book must be read with some caution because it was written at the height of Islamic sovereignty, and so, you just have to understand how for a modern reader some of the things might be a little shocking...but overall, it's one of the most important books.

What “caution” is being suggested? And who must have caution? Are these modern sentiments that would be shocked by the Shifā’ true and justified or false? In a bizarre move for a ‘traditional’ Islamic scholar, Shaykh Hamza would appear to be saying they are true and justified. And what are the

implications of having been “written at the height of Islamic sovereignty”? I would argue the opinions of a scholarly tradition at the height of their sovereignty reflect their integrity better, as opposed to taqiya-esque positions issued in a state of feebleness. Therefore, our opinions on the greatest of subjects, the Life of the Prophet ﷺ, is surely reflected with more honesty and integrity when we are at the height of sovereignty and not constantly feeling the need to do apologetics.

كلهم عالجوا الشفا و لكن ما أتى بالشفا غير عياض

They all sought to heal, but none achieved healing except ‘Iyād — Abu Abdullah Al Miknāsī al Fāsī

It is not a coincidence that the Shifā’ is the most studied, printed, commentated, and praised of all the sīra books. The qabūl of the ‘awām and the khawās received by the book is unprecedented. In his Madkhalilā Kitāb al-Shifā’, the great Maghrebi scholar al-Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kattānī wrote: “As a result of [the greatness of the book] it became — after the Book of Allah — the most sought-after [book], not a house or a place would be without it from East to the West.” (page 76). Here is a brief list of statements made about the Shifā’ and Qādī ‘Iyād by the ulema in al-Kattānī’s book:

As for Qadi Iyad, it should suffice that he possessed nobility and majesty, reliance, trust and knowledge, agreed upon by all — Taqiyy al-Dīn al-Subkī in his book Shifā’ al-Siqām (page 81)

His (Qadi Iyad) creative innovation in it is unprecedented — no one has criticized him for his unique work, and no one can deny the indebtedness of other works that followed it, you can see the general agreement of all upon it...hence it spread East to West — Al-Burhān Ibn Farhūn in his al-Dībāj (page 88).

It is a most sublime book. No one has authored like it in this subject. In fact it is one of the Pillars of Islam (arkān). —Tash Kubra Zadeh in his Miftāh al-Sa'āda.

We can go on for hundreds of pages where Shaykh al-Kattānī enumerates the greatness of this book, miracles such as literal healing of the body from ailments by reading it, reliance of the ulema on it, dreams of scholars and commoners seeing Qādī 'Iyād with the Prophet ﷺ.

Shaykh Hamza knows all this. So, what has happened? What happened to that young firebrand who inspired so many? What is this inward conflict Shaykh Hamza now struggles with? Again, what should one be “cautious” about when reading a book of such reputation, one of the most important in all our tradition? Shaykh Hamza leaves it to his audience to guess that. The implication is: “There is something wrong with our tradition. You need me to fix it so that it can be acceptable to our time.”

Then Shaykh Hamza starts his presentation talking about the Meccan Period. He briefly touches on themes of “forbearance, patience, and prayer” during

this period.

HY: And then this was the time of mujahada

وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ
الْمُحْسِنِينَ

This is in Surah al-'Ankabūt, but it was revealed in Makkah, before military jihad. So, this is the primary Jihad. “Those who struggle for our sake We will guide to our ways” [...] so Allah is with the people of ihsān because that is what comes out of it.”

What is “the primary jihad”? Does that exclude warfare? This is not what the ulema say! Baydāwī and Abū Su'ūd point out that the jihād prescribed in this verse is unrestricted, and explicitly state it includes offensive jihād! The ulema note that this verse was revealed before military jihād, but none of them draw the bizarre conclusion that this means military jihād is not covered by the verse! Allah in His knowledge knew that the military jihād would soon be established, and that these verses would be read by the whole umma for the rest of history!

HY: So, when the Prophet makes Hijrah, this is one of the first [ayats]:

أَذِنَ لِلَّذِينَ يُقْتَلُونَ بِأَنَّهُمْ ظَلَمُوا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَىٰ
نَصْرِهِمْ لَقَدِيرٌ

الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِنْ دِيَارِهِمْ بِغَيْرِ حَقٍّ إِلَّا أَنْ يَقُولُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ
وَلَوْلَا دَفْعُ اللَّهِ النَّاسَ بَعْضَهُمْ بِبَعْضٍ لَفُتِنَتِ
صَوَامِعُ وَبَيْعٌ وَصَلَوَاتٌ وَمَسْجِدٌ يُذَكَّرُ فِيهَا اسْمُ اللَّهِ كَثِيرًا
وَلَيَنْصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَنْصُرُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ

HY: Permission was granted to those who fight...so the reason they were permitted to fight was because they have been oppressed...and Allah...he is capable of giving them victory...so they have been removed from their homes without just right...they are persecuted... only for saying: Our Lord is Allah!...so here had it not been for God using some people to constrain other people and it's very interesting that He didn't say the Muslims and the kuffar. He said some people to constrain other people. Traditionally a lot of mufasssirun said that this was meant the Muslims constraining the non-Muslims, but I think Allah put it there for a reason because sometimes it's going to be people Allah raises up who will stop other people from oppressing people... so this gives you the real reason for jihad it is for religious freedom and this is one of the things that Juan Cole really brings out in this book... is that the Prophet..he [Cole] says his whole mission was for two fundamental reasons: 1) to make the world safe for religion...religion, nakira (نكرة)..for people of faith to practice without being persecuted as they saw it, 2) and for commerce and isn't it interesting that he is the Merchant Prophet like why did Allah make him a merchant? because nothing is better for our worldly lives than commerce and nothing is better for our spiritual lives than religion so these are the two great benefits that our Prophet brought to make the world safe, for conscience, that people could worship Allah as they saw and also for commerce and this is why.. if had it not been you would have seen temples ... the monasteries and the Christian and Jewish temples destroyed... and the masjids...and Allah will give victory to those who aid the religion of God...

“Traditionally a lot of mufasssirūn said that

this meant the Muslims constraining the non-Muslims, but I think...” Ideally this should end the discussion. How does Zaytuna claim to be traditional when they have institutional *عندية*? It is acceptable to offer opinions — even if a minority one — but within the framework of agreed upon *usūl*. Claiming *jihād* exists to promote religious freedom is a total departure, and a gesture to secularism. Is this the *jihād* of John Locke? Something like this can come from the Mustafa Akyols of the world but coming from a ‘traditionalist’ is mighty strange.

HY: So this gives you the real reason for jihad it is for religious freedom and this is one of the things that Juan Cole really brings out in this book...is that the Prophet...he [Cole] says his whole mission was for two fundamental reasons: 1) to make the world safe for religion...religion nakera (نكرة)..for people of faith to practice without being persecuted as they saw it, 2) and for commerce.

This is just more conflicted obfuscation. There seem to be two Shaykh Hamzas, fighting against one another. This lecture is about warfare and not only *jihād* which is broader than *qitāl*, fighting/killing. Rather he should have spoken about *qitāl*— which is specific to actual fighting—and made a case against our conventional understanding of *qitāl*. *Qitāl* is a reciprocal form, the root of which (q-t-l, 'to kill') occurs in the Qur'an more frequently than the root for *jihād*. As for the statement, “so this gives you the real reason for *jihād* it is for religious freedom”, Shaykh Hamza’s favorite *sīra* author, Shaykh Zahni Dahlan, begs to

differ: “The Prophet and his companions continued yaqātīlūn (fighting) until people entered the dīn of Allah in droves (afwāja) upon droves.” (page 352)

As for Juan Cole’s claims that the mission of the Prophet was to 1) make the world safe for religion, any religion, and 2) to promote commerce, this is a claim that no Muslim can take seriously despite it sounding very “humane and liberal” and would attract good press for Zaytuna from liberal America. This from a man who also claims in the book:

“Although most of his biographers have treated him as a provincial holy man, Muhammad traveled widely. He would have been acquainted with Roman law, culture, and languages. Contrary both to later Muslim apologetics and to the assumptions of Western Orientalists, he was literate, as any great long-distance merchant would have been. He knew the Bible, probably in written Aramaic versions and oral Arab traditions, though possibly in Greek as well. In his thirties, I suspect, Muhammad’s inner thirst took him to Christian monasteries, eldritch shrines, Jewish synagogues, and Neoplatonist salons in Damascus and Bosra. Unexpectedly, his quest ended when its object came instead to him.”

Shaykh Hamza makes this kāfir more of an authority than the mufassirūn whose words he would prefer to dismiss. Here, Cole is not talking about the “real” knowledge of the Prophet which encompasses more than the world can hold, but the “acquired” knowledge of the Prophet that the disbelievers must assume. This we know is not the case. Case in point, when Sayyidna

Ali ibn Abi Talib (RA) refused to erase the name of the Prophet from a document in Hudaybiyya, and then the Prophet asked where his name was so he could do it himself. He ﷺ “knew the Bible in Aramaic” but we have established reports of him not able to read Arabic? He is *al-nabiyy al ummiyy* as Allah Himself states in the Qur’an.

Then Shaykh Hamza delves into his favorite jihād al-akbar and al-asghar theme.

رجعنا من الجهاد الأصغر، إلى الجهاد الأكبر

HY: now this is called.... it's a weak hadith. Imam Bayhaqi relates it but it's absolutely sound in its meaning and all of our ulema have accepted this distinction between the two jihads, jihād al akbar and jihād al asghar...the reason why the jihād of the ego is the great jihād is because it's constant you have to do it all the time many of us will never be at war will never go to war you can reach as I have a seventh decade without ever having been I haven't ever been in war I've been close to it I was on the border of Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion but I have not fought in a war but I have to fight myself I have to fight my ego so that is why it's greater because the majority of our ummah will never fight and the Prophet said people should at least want to defend the truth...

Shaykh Hamza often refers to the hadith about the minor jihād (fighting) versus the major jihād (purification of the self). He uses this as an overarching principle and criterion. But this hadith is weak (in fact, the muhaddithīn say it not even a hadith) and it really does not explain anything about the issue at hand. We

take into consideration weak ahadith if they are in fadā'il, but not when we need to explain the māhiyya of something. Therefore, it is no surprise that the biggest contemporary fiqh compilation in the Arabic language for Ahl ul Sunna, the الموسوعة الفقهية الكويتية (45 volumes), does not mention this hadith once.

The work took around fifty years to complete. It is one of the most authoritative books on Sunni fiqh. No scholar worth their salt will have anything remotely critical to say about it for lacking authority or traditional pedigree. It's the fruit of labor of many contemporary scholars. It combines the most authoritative positions from the four Sunni schools on all matters of the Sharī'a. The section on jihād is in volume 16, page 124-164. Yet no mention of this hadith. Why? Because it does not add to our understanding of the term and therefore, we can't deduce any hukm from it.

وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَلَا تَعْتَدُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ

HY: Now this is my proof...because this was early debate among the Muslims...is jihad only defensive or offensive? Empire went offensive and a lot of fuqaha went that route. But there were fuqaha that said NO."

I would like to know who those fuqaha were. Hold on, he does mention them:

HY: Ibn Taymiyya actually said that all the

Prophets' battles were defensive... like when they went to Jordan when they saw that there was no he had been there were rumors that the Byzantines were planning to invade that's why they went but when they saw it wasn't true he brought the army came back...so this (Baqarah 190) to me is a proof that jihad is defensive because it says "do not aggress"! Allah does not love aggressors" Is Allah's love fickle? Hashabu...God does not change... this is not abrogated."

Tafsir Jalalayn on this verse: "After the Prophet was prevented from visiting the House in the year of the battle of Hudaibiyya he made a pact with the disbelievers that he would be allowed to return the following year at which time they would vacate Mecca for three days. Having prepared to depart for the Visitation 'umra he and the believers were concerned that Quraysh would not keep to the agreement and instigate fighting. The Muslims were averse to becoming engaged in fighting while in a state of pilgrimage inviolability in the Sacred Enclosure al-haram and during the sacred months and so the following was revealed And fight in the way of God to elevate His religion with those who fight against you the disbelievers but aggress not against them by initiating the fighting; God loves not the aggressors the ones that overstep the bounds which God has set for them this stipulation was abrogated by the verse of barā'a 'immunity': This is a discharge from all obligations, by Allah and His Messenger, to the polytheists you [believers] have entered into treaties with"(9:1). In other words, abrogation did take place. Muslims were permitted to

initiate war. Shaykh Hamza then goes on to explain the types of jihād. He calls them:

- Lesser jihad
- Intellectual jihad
- Spiritual Jihad

HY: Now what are the types of jihad? [...] there's jihad Asghar which is the military jihad and then there's the intellectual jihad. Wa jabid bibi jibadan kaberaan...Allah says do Jihad with the Quran so that's an intellectual jihad so it's actually ijihad... I mean it's not for nothing that the word for the jurist who's really trying to think deeply it's from the same root so also refuting obfuscations refuting people that attack Islam and then jihad al Akbar which is the jihad to purify the heart now the Prophet had 29 expeditions now they're called battles in English, it's a total mistranslation...ghazwa does not mean battle...ma'raka means battle...Ghazwa means a military expedition it doesn't mean that there's going to be fighting,

“It doesn’t mean there’s going to be fighting?” We are not talking here lughatan, rather istilāhan. Shaykh Zayni Dahlān: it is the way of the muhaddithīn and sīra writers generally in there istilāhāt (terminologies) to call every military confrontation that He ﷺ attending with his noble self “ghazwa”. Ones where he sent other Companions is called sariyya and ba‘th.”

HY: So, there were 29 — how many actually had fighting? Eleven, that means 18 had no fighting, so to call them battles is just wrong — so two-thirds almost were peaceful... 23 years times 354 days (lunar calendar) so the Prophet’s mission is 24 years,

so that's 8142 blessed days of the profits I mean his whole life was blessed but this is his life I mean people don't think about this but we only have on average you know like four thousand weeks not a lot of time in a lifetime four thousand weeks that's it 80 years give you four thousand weeks so 8142 days so how many of those days were fighting 70 Now if you read this book (Martin Lings) you'll just come to the conclusion that that's all they were doing but there's only 70 days of fight where there's war...

This is a misleading way of framing the issue. Yes, it’s true that the Prophet took part in 29 battles, but there were also expeditions and raids that were sent by his orders. In the words of Shaykh Zayni Dahlān: “As for the expeditions in which the Companions were sent, they numbered 47 and some say it exceeds 70”. (page 353).

Then Shaykh Hamza discusses some statistics on the deaths caused at the ghazawāt of the Prophet. This was the least controversial part of the lecture. Yes, this is factually true and is a refutation of those who falsely claim the Prophet loved bloodshed. But the statistics on fatalities do not prove that the Prophet had pacifist tendencies. It just adds to our belief that as the Prophet of Mercy, even the enemies of Islam suffered less in situations where bloodshed could have been by orders of magnitude greater. But this does not take away from the fact that he was also the Prophet of Battles (nabi al-malāhim). Hudhaifa bin al Yamaan (RA): I once was walking in the streets of Madina...I heard the Prophet ﷺ say while he was also walking: “I am Muhammad, and

MARCH 2024

Ahmed and the Prophet of Mercy, and the Prophet whose Ummah's repentance is accepted and The First to be Resurrected, and the One who is the true inheritor of the Prophets, and the Prophet who takes part in battles (Musnad Imam Ahmed).



We will continue in the second part.

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**ABU HURAIRA NARRATED THAT THE MESSENGER OF ALLAH (ﷺ) SAID:
"I HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO FIGHT THE PEOPLE UNTIL THEY SAY LA
ILAHA ILLALLAH", AND IF THEY SAY THAT, THEN THEIR BLOOD AND
WEALTH WILL BE PROTECTED FROM ME, EXCEPT WHAT IT MAKES
OBLIGATORY UPON THEM, AND THEIR RECKONING IS UP TO ALLAH."**





Saladin by Gustave Dore

Journal